A FRAMEWORK FOR DELIVERING

# CLIMATE ACTION

In Settings Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Overlapping threats posed by climate change, climate-related hazards and fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) threaten the World Bank's vision of a world free of poverty on a livable planet.** Left unchecked, climate change is expected to push an additional 132 million people into extreme poverty by 2030. By then, two-thirds of the global population living in extreme poverty will be located in countries affected by FCV. This dual burden of climate change and FCV not only compounds existing vulnerabilities but also exacerbates challenges such as food insecurity, disease outbreaks, and natural resource degradation, making it even harder for communities to thrive.

**Ensuring countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence can adapt to climate related hazards is a pressing global challenge.** The World Bank can play a pivotal role in delivering climate action and the finance needed to support it in these countries, increasing the ability of communities in FCV-affected settings to deal with the impacts of climate change while reducing the likelihood that climate impacts contribute to wider compound crises. Doing so effectively, however, requires climate programming to be delivered in a manner that is sensitive to dynamics of fragility, conflict and violence.

**Adopting an FCV-sensitive approach to climate programming is essential for two reasons.** First, FCV presents significant political, economic and security-related obstacles to service provision, stalling progress in delivering climate-related interventions. Second, failing to consider the impact that an intervention could have on FCV dynamics themselves may lead to maladaptation—inadvertently increasing the vulnerability of the very communities that climate actions are meant to support.

**To support the development and adoption of an FCV-sensitive approach to climate action, both within the World Bank and the wider development space.** This document presents a new Framework for promoting FCV-Sensitive Climate Action. The Framework includes two core elements: i) outlining several principles for FCV-sensitivity that can be applied in all settings, and ii) providing guidance on tailoring climate action to the unique challenges, needs, and capacities of different fragile and conflict-affected environments. While the former element builds on existing resources aimed at promoting FCV-sensitive climate action, the latter extends currently available tools that often treat FCV-affected settings as homogenous.

# HOW TO USE THE FRAMEWORK

**This Framework exists to help technical and non-technical teams in development organizations embed FCV-sensitivity into the design and prioritization of climate-related programming.** It primarily targets analytics and diagnostics that support country and regional programming as well as Advisory Services and Analytics (ASAs) such as Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs) and Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs), alongside country engagement products.

**The FCV-sensitive considerations in the Framework are relevant to any climate-related intervention, irrespective of the given sector.** They are as appropriate for the design of a national portfolio of green energy investments as they are to scaling up regional adaptive social protection systems. Indeed, while the priority for most FCV-affected countries will be to support adaptation, the Framework can similarly be used for promoting FCV-sensitivity in mitigation activities–recognizing that mitigation will be a priority for some FCV-affected countries, as well as the many overlaps between mitigation and effective adaptation.

**Finally, the Framework serves to bolster the World Bank's ability to respond to pressing global challenges.** It builds on core strategic frameworks such as the World Bank's Climate Change Action Plan and FCV Strategy which together outline an ambitious agenda for strengthening the resilience of the most vulnerable communities. By providing practical guidance on how to promote FCV-sensitive climate action in the most challenging operational environments, the Framework is in line with the Evolution Roadmap which aims to increase the World Bank's capacity to respond to intertwined challenges and crises ranging from climate change and food insecurity to fragility and pandemic recovery.

# PROMOTING FCV-SENSITIVE CLIMATE ACTION

**Before delving into how to promote FCV-sensitive climate action, it's first important to clarify what we mean by it.** FCV-sensitive climate action refers to climate programming that is designed and implemented with a clear understanding of FCV dynamics in a given context. This means ensuring that climate interventions not only recognize how FCV dynamics could affect program delivery but are also structured in a way that minimizes any potential harm. FCV-sensitive actions avoid exacerbating existing tensions or contributing to the root causes of FCV and, where possible, seek to actively address sources of fragility while strengthening resilience. In practice, this includes carefully balancing operations that tackle FCV-related risks with broader developmental goals, avoiding activities that might deepen inequalities or undermine state legitimacy, and ensuring interventions are grounded in data and designed to promote social cohesion. More information on FCV-sensitive approaches can be found in the World Bank's good practice note on FCV sensitive Program and Portfolio Analyses (World Bank 2022).

**With this in mind, we present a Framework for FCV-sensitive Climate Action built around two distinct yet interrelated steps: i) applying general principles of FCV-sensitivity, and ii) tailoring FCV sensitive recommendations to different environments.** While each can be used to address critical FCV-related challenges in isolation, delivering FCV-sensitive climate action in a holistic manner requires both steps to be carefully considered.

**FIGURE 1.**

A Framework for Promoting FCV-sensitive Climate Action

**Applying General Principles of FCV-sensitivity**

Seek opportunities to promote to common Principles for embedding FCV-sensitivity in proposed climate programming. These Principles can be thought of a minimum-standards for FCV-sensitive climate action and are applicable across all FCV settings.

**Tailoring FCV-sensitivity to Different FCV Environments**

Beyond applying the general principles, tailor climate interventions to address the specific dynamics of each FCV context. Customize actions to account for the unique vulnerabilities, capacities, and risks present in different FCV-affected environments. The framework offers targeted guidance and entry points for adapting programming to seven illustrative FCV scenarios.

# 1. THINGS TO CONSIDER WHEN PROMOTING FCV SENSITIVITY IN ANY CONTEXT

**A first step in delivering climate programming in FCV-affected settings is to ensure that proposed interventions align with common principles of FCV-sensitivity.** These serve as the basic building blocks of an FCV-sensitive approach and aim to not only prevent climate actions from exacerbating underlying FCV-dynamics, but also encourage opportunities to contribute to wider resilience and peacebuilding.

**Below we highlight five things to consider as part of the Framework for FCV-sensitive Climate Action.** Crucially, they can applied in any FCV affected setting—while noting that some are likely to be more relevant than others depending on the core FCV characteristics of each environment. The Framework offers concise illustrations of its applicability across various country contexts. These include examples from peace-sensitive low-carbon development initiatives in Colombia, gender-responsive strategies for resource mediation in Sudan, analyses aimed at anticipating and preventing maladaptation in the Palestinian Territories, and efforts to enhance coordination among development, humanitarian, and peace sectors in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

**FIGURE 2.**

Promoting FCV-sensitive Climate Action—Things to consider

### Consider how interactions between climate & FCV affect program delivery

Thoroughly assess how climate-related impacts and FCV dynamics interact in the specific context. Identify key vulnerabilities and risks to ensure climate interventions are well-suited to the environment. This ensures programs address not only climate-related hazards but also reduce the risk of exacerbating existing conflicts or governance challenges

### Mitigate the risk of climate actions resulting in maladaptation

Ensure climate interventions are designed to avoid unintended negative consequences. Take into account how actions could worsen vulnerabilities or social tensions, especially in fragile contexts. Build in flexibility, long-term planning, and safeguard measures to prevent climate actions from inadvertently escalating conflicts or deepening fragility.



### Prioritize climate actions that address FCV root causes & enhance peacebuilding

Focus climate programming on tackling the underlying drivers of conflict and fragility. Seek opportunities where climate actions can contribute to peacebuilding, social cohesion, and governance strengthening. Align interventions with local peacebuilding efforts to ensure they promote stability while addressing climate risks.

### Prioritize the needs and capacities of vulnerable regions and groups

Ensure that the most vulnerable populations-those disproportionately affected by both climate impacts and FCV-are central to climate actions. Design programs that consider their unique needs, capacities, and perspectives, empowering them through active participation and ensuring equitable benefits.

### Encourage coordination across development, DRM, & peacebuilding actors

Promote cross-sectoral collaboration among development, disaster risk management, humanitarian, and peacebuilding actors to address overlapping challenges. Effective coordination can maximize resources, avoid duplication, and ensure that climate actions contribute to broader development and peacebuilding goals, creating more resilient communities

# 2. TAILORING CLIMATE ACTION TO DIFFERENT FCV SETTINGS

**While the high-level principles outlined above provide guidance on addressing core aspects of FCV sensitivity, they are not sufficient on their own.** They need to be supplemented by efforts to further adapt interventions to the unique risks, challenges, and needs facing different fragile and conflict affected settings.

**The second step in the Framework seeks to ensure that FCV-sensitive guidelines are tailored to the diversity of different FCV settings.** Five illustrative—and often overlapping—FCV characteristics, highlight the various factors that should be incorporated into FCV-sensitive climate action.

**For each illustrative characteristic of FCV, the Framework for FCV Sensitive Climate Action describes: i) the primary FCV threats that affect them; ii) the implications of climate and FCV interactions for delivery of climate action; and iii) recommendations for tailoring FCV-sensitive climate action to each set of characteristics.** The main report presents guiding questions and key considerations for each as well as a reference table to support users of the framework.

**These FCV characteristics are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.** Countries can, and often are, affected by overlapping characteristics that create unique situations of FCV. As such, the recommendations in this framework are not intended to be applied in a vacuum but should respond to specific considerations relevant to a given FCV-affected country. They help at the country level to equip users with baseline knowledge of how to advance climate action in a variety of FCV settings, and to limit the risk of climate action inadvertently exacerbating FCV risks.

**FIGURE 3.**

Examples of common FCV characteristics that can influence the nature and delivery of climate action




The graphic illustrates common characteristics of FCV. These characteristics are overlapping and illustrative, rather than strictly sequential. The sizes of the elements generally indicate a trend from less to more common occurrences, though this pattern is not universally applicable.

# BRINGING THE FRAMEWORK TOGETHER

**This conceptual framework is intended to help users design and implement climate-related activities in a range of FCV-affected settings.** To support this effort, we showcase several country-specific examples below that provide suggestions based on the applying the framework. While the tool offers valuable guidance, it is important to supplement inputs from a range of other relevant sources, such as World Bank FCV country coordinators and relevant Global Practice experts, as well as insights from country-specific resources like Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs) and Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs) where applicable. Future products, including a Flagship report on climate action in FCV, will extend the conceptual basis of this report by providing additional insight into operationalizing the framework in practice.

## Insights that inspired a Framework for FCV Sensitive Climate Action: Country examples

### LEBANON: FOSTERING LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS AND ACCOMMODATING DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE TO PROMOTE RESILIENCE

**CONTEXT:** As of late 2024, Lebanon faces compounded institutional and political fragility, characterized by ongoing armed conflict, a large refugee population, and economic inequality. These challenges have eroded trust between communities, weakened governance, and created significant barriers to cohesive climate action. Climate change is expected to further exacerbate Lebanon's vulnerabilities, with projections of increased heatwaves and diminished water conservation capacity. The country is among the least prepared in the region to adapt to these impacts.[lvi]

**PROMOTING FCV-SENSITIVE CLIMATE ACTION IN LEBANON:** In applying core aspects of the Framework, users are encouraged to consider the socio-political and institutional dynamics that shape Lebanon's ability to implement climate interventions effectively (see Chapter B-I on 'How interactions between climate and FCV affect program delivery' in the main report). Using its guiding questions and suggested resources, teams may seek to prioritize actions that address Lebanon's most pressing vulnerabilities, such as water resource management, while minimizing risks of exacerbating inequalities or tensions. For instance, the Framework prompts teams to assess how proposed actions could influence community trust or perceptions of fairness.

Using these insights, teams are encouraged to ensure climate actions align with Lebanon's decentralized governance structures and capitalize on the strong local identities in different regions as potential partners for implementation. By promoting targeted, inclusive, and locally anchored interventions, the Framework supports users to consider climate actions that not only address environmental risks but also foster greater resilience and social stability.

### LAKE CHAD REGION: ADDRESSING TRANSBOUNDARY COMPLEXITIES

Context: The Lake Chad region spans several countries that sustain the livelihoods of over 30 million people. It faces interconnected crises of fragility, conflict, and displacement, which are compounded by climate risks such as droughts, floods, and desertification. High poverty levels, weak institutions, and armed groups controlling significant areas exacerbate these vulnerabilities, creating a highly volatile environment for climate action.[lvii]

**PROMOTING FCV-SENSITIVE CLIMATE ACTION:** The Framework encourages users to consider the interconnected and transboundary nature of challenges across the Lake Chad region (see Chapter B2 on 'Transboundary FCV Characteristics' in the main report). This includes prioritizing climate actions that not only address shared drivers of vulnerability, such as displacement and weak governance, but also promote regional cooperation to manage overlapping climate and FCV risks. Recognizing the importance of working across borders, the Framework emphasizes collaborative approaches that align with both local capacities and regional priorities.

By fostering integration across development, disaster risk management, and peacebuilding sectors, the Framework encourages interventions that cut across sectoral silos. For example, actions aimed at restoring livelihoods or improving access to resources can also strengthen social cohesion and reduce conflict over scarce resources. By promoting resilience-building efforts that are inclusive and context-sensitive, the Framework can support teams in considering interventions that contribute to long-term stability and trust among communities while addressing urgent climate risks.

### AFGHANISTAN: PRIORITIZING ACCESS TO CLIMATE ACTION FOR MARGINALIZED GROUPS

**CONTEXT:** Afghanistan's decades-long conflict has resulted in weak government institutions, a punitive legal environment, and entrenched discrimination against women and minorities. These longstanding challenges are aggravated by severe susceptibility to climate hazards, including flash floods, droughts, and extreme temperatures, which intensify displacement and deteriorate health conditions across the population.[lviii] National authorities remain largely excluded from many international forums and processes, including UNFCCC climate negotiations. While direct conflict has reduced in intensity, the country's social contract remains severely fractured, with profound repercussions for women, girls, and other marginalized groups.

**PROMOTING FCV-SENSITIVE CLIMATE ACTION:** Noting the difficult operational environment in Afghanistan, the Framework emphasizes the need to ensure that climate-related interventions are tailored to the unique conditions and capacities in the country and do not further contribute to the drivers of FCV. With this in mind, users are likely to consider options to prioritize vulnerable

populations in the design of climate actions, ensuring interventions avoid exacerbating risks or reinforcing inequalities (see Chapter B-IV on 'Recognizing the needs and capacities of vulnerable groups' in the main report). It advocates for localized approaches by encouraging teams to identify and collaborate with trusted local actors and champions. This is especially important in Afghanistan's fragmented context, where local partnerships can facilitate the development of inclusive and responsive interventions. Given the prolonged presence of humanitarian and peace organizations due to the country's protracted crises, the Framework highlights the importance of sequencing efforts to build on their expertise and established networks.

The cases outlined above are illustrative, and meant to highlight the sorts of considerations needed in promoting FCV climate action in different settings. For further details on key issues and themes, refer to the framework in the main report.

**The framework and its guiding questions are meant to empower users who may have expertise in climate change and climate-related hazards but are less familiar with the challenges of operating in FCV-related environments (or vice versa).** As such, it seeks to facilitate deeper and more informed conversations between operational staff and technical experts on designing FCV-sensitive climate action. This includes important dialogue on how to assess specific FCV threats and vulnerabilities, how to prioritize the most at-risk regions or sectors, and how to design climate-related activities that are best suited to the political and economic environment of a given FCV-affected country. Together with related sectoral diagnostic tools, such as CCDRs and RRA, the Framework for FCV Sensitive Climate Action helps to promote more effective resilience building in the face of overlapping climate and FCV-related threats.

**Above all, the Framework is a reminder that promoting FCV-sensitive climate action is not a one-size-fits-all approach and requires a wide range of inputs to tailor guidance to the needs of different FCV settings.** It is not enough to follow general principles of FCV sensitivity (such as those outlined in the first step of the framework). Users also need to understand how interactions between climate and FCV affect the feasibility and effectiveness of proposed climate actions in specific FCV settings. These extra steps don't necessarily require considerable extra effort. Yet, they are fundamental to limiting the risk of maladaptation and prioritizing climate actions that help to address the root causes of FCV.

# A.

# DISENTANGLING CLIMATE CHANGE & FCV INTERACTIONS

## KEY MESSAGES

- **FCV-affected settings are among those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.** Climate change serves as a threat multiplier, compounding wider threats and exacerbating–both directly and indirectly–the drivers of FCV.
- **In turn, challenges related to FCV reduce the capacity of people and communities to respond to climate change and climate-related hazards, heightening their vulnerability.** FCV undermines institutional adaptive capacity by weakening institutions and government capacity, eroding social cohesion and collective action, and constraining economic and livelihood options.
- **Climate action can (and often does) have an impact on FCV dynamics.** While many adaptation and mitigation activities can help to address the underlying drivers of FCV, those that are poorly designed or executed can lead to maladaptation–where climate impacts and vulnerabilities are inadvertently increased. In the worst cases, climate actions can aggravate fragility, conflict and violence.
- **Promoting FCV-sensitive climate actions is key to ensuring that adaptation and mitigation interventions do not exacerbate FCV.** This includes safeguarding the needs of regions, sectors and social groups that are most vulnerable to interacting climate and FCV-related threats.

**Countries affected by FCV are on the front lines of the climate crisis.** Of the 25 countries rated as most vulnerable to climate change according to the ND-GAIN Index, 15 appear on the World Bank's list of fragile and conflict-affected situations in FY24. While FCV-affected settings vary considerably, they often lack the ability to deal with climate-related hazards due to a combination of social, economic and political factors. In turn, the impacts of climate change can serve to exacerbate both the structural factors and drivers of FCV creating a "vicious cycle."

**In this context, structural factors refer to the deep-rooted, systemic conditions that shape a country's political, economic, and social landscape, influencing its susceptibility to FCV.** These factors are typically slow to change and include elements such as historical legacies of conflict, weak institutions, entrenched social inequalities, reliance on natural resource extraction, and the nature of governance and political systems. Structural factors set the underlying conditions within which FCV challenges can emerge, creating vulnerabilities that are exacerbated by climate change. In contrast, drivers of FCV are the more immediate and dynamic forces that trigger or intensify fragility and conflict. ***Drivers*** of FCV, such as political exclusion, economic shocks, or competition over resources, often operate within the broader framework established by structural factors. While structural factors provide the foundational vulnerabilities, drivers1 are the specific, proximate catalysts that convert these vulnerabilities into active conflict or instability. Together, these two elements create a complex interplay, where structural factors shape the environment, and drivers push the context toward fragility and violence.

**A growing body of research is helping to understand the complex relationship between climate change, climate-related hazards, FCV and the pathways through which they interact.** While the evidence base is still emerging, three considerations are important when seeking to promote FCV-sensitive climate action, including: i) How do climate change and climate-related hazards influence FCV dynamics, ii) Does FCV erodes the capacity to respond to climate change and climate-related hazards; and iii) What are the implications of adaptation and mitigation actions on FCV dynamics? A broad overview of the key issues and status of the latest evidence on each is presented below. Note that these simply provide a high-level summary of a wide body of research and literature on the topic. We encourage readers to refer to referenced materials and wider literature for more detailed insights into each given the nuances and context-specificity required to understand interactions between climate and FCV.

1 For more information on differences between structural factors and drivers of FCV, refer to the World Bank's RRA Methodology Note

# HOW CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLIMATE-RELATED HAZARDS INFLUENCE FCV DYNAMICS

**Key to supporting FCV-sensitive climate action is understanding how impacts related to climate change can influence FCV-related outcomes.** A number of influential studies have sought to do so by establishing direct causal mechanisms between the two. These studies typically employe statistical and econometric research methods to examine the relationships between the existence and intensity of FCV threats (typically conflict and violence) and proxies for climate change, such as higher temperatures, precipitation extremes, and natural hazards.[xii] Box 1 summarizes high-level findings from a variety of influential studies, disaggregated by climate and FCV-related threat, revealing a wide range of insights and conclusions.

**Box 1 underscores the heterogeneity of evidence linking climate change and climate-related hazards to FCV-related outcomes.** With this in mind, it is important to recognize the considerable challenges faced in disentangling causal relationships between climate and FCV using traditional causal inference techniques. These include poor geographic and temporal availability of data, alongside differing definitions and timeframes related to both climate change and FCV. In addition, the many indirect drivers that influence the relationship between climate change, climate-related hazards and FCV, alongside the need to rely on natural (or quasi) experiments, make it especially difficult to account for issues of endogeneity.

**Noting the various challenges associated with collecting quantitative causal evidence, a valuable body of qualitative research has also emerged seeking to uncover the mediating roles played by factors such as governance, culture, entitlements and social cohesion.** Much of this research centers on the role that climate change and climate-related hazards play as a threat multiplier. Climate change is seen as having a compounding effect on FCV, by exacerbating competition over scarce natural resources such as water and arable land, with the potential to escalate pre-existing tensions or ongoing conflict.[xiii] In this way, the impacts of climate change aggravate existing socio-economic and political challenges such as inequality, marginalization, and dysfunctional state-societal relationships.[xiv]

**Evidence suggests that the intersections between the effects of disasters and FCV can be mutually reinforcing, and that how disasters are managed must take care not to exacerbate fragility, conflict, and the likelihood of violence.**[xv] For example, the World Bank's "Defueling Conflict" report documents how in Burkina Faso, traditional and customary mechanisms used to resolve land conflicts through dialogue and consensus have become less effective due to compounding social and environmental changes from migration and population growth, land pressures, and a reduced asset base exacerbated by climate-related hazards.[xvi]

## BOX 1. Summary of quantitative research on the impacts of climate change, climate variability and natural hazards on FCV related outcomes

**Precipitation extremes and conflict:** Research linking extreme rainfall events with conflict yields mixed results. Several studies have suggested that armed conflict is more frequent and intense in years with higher precipitation[xvii]. However, most quantitative studies fail to find a robust correlation between 'wet years' and armed conflict. The literature also disagrees on the nature of how extreme rainfall events lead to increased risk of conflict, often pointing to context-specific relationships. For example, drier conditions appear to increase the risk of communal conflicts in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and livestock related violence in Kenya, but wetter periods do the same in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Other studies show that drier than normal conditions do not affect conflict but wetter than normal conditions decrease the likelihood of conflict.[xviii] Further work is examining how variable rainfall patterns such as delays in rainy seasons or rains in the wrong place may undermine agriculture patterns and induce small-scale conflict.[xix] Taken together, these findings suggest that direct linkages between precipitation extremes and conflict are complex, context-specific, and not easily generalizable.

**Higher temperatures, drought, and conflict:** There is little agreement as to how higher temperatures and droughts relate to armed conflict. An influential study found rainfall shocks and temperature variations were strongly correlated with civil conflict and violence.[xx] This study, however, came under scrutiny for not adequately incorporating social and political variables that indirectly affect the likelihood of armed conflict.[xxi] A follow up study found a relatively weak relationship between temperatures and conflict, which disappeared in the data after 2002, likely due to the influence of peacebuilding, improved development performance, and better governance.[xxii] Other research reports divergent findings related to temperature and armed conflict.[xxiii] In short, research linking temperature extremes and drought to armed conflict has been largely uncertain.

**Disasters and conflict:**[xxiv] Climate change is expected to increase the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events. This includes heatwaves, flooding, droughts, extreme storms (tropical cyclones, atmospheric rivers), and storm surges.[xxv] Existing empirical evidence suggests that disasters do not increase the risk of conflict but could, under some conditions, affect the duration of conflicts and the frequency of both government repression and political unrest.[xxvi] Notably, other studies show that disasters that affect a large proportion of the country's population actually decrease the chance of unrest, potentially because such catastrophes generate solidarity and cooperation.[xxvii]

**Transboundary resources and conflict:** Research remains focused primarily on water resources.[xxviii] Early research on water scarcity, for example, showed an increase in the risk of conflict in shared river basins, relative to other country pairings, and that the risk of conflict is more pronounced in upstream/downstream configurations.[xxix] However, most studies argue that water scarcity enhances incentives for states to cooperate over transboundary resources, not fight.[xxx] Drier than average conditions reduce the likelihood of disputes over shared river basins. The development of transboundary water agreements and effective international water frameworks also mitigate the risk of conflict.[xxxi]

**Climate-related hazards and gender-based violence:** Much of the literature on climate change and violent conflict has focused on the national and subnational level and has largely overlooked gendered dimensions. However, there is a growing literature underscoring how temperature and precipitation variability, alongside natural-hazard induced disasters, are linked to gender-based violence. For example, research indicates that women and girls are up to 14 percent more likely to be harmed in the aftermath of a disaster.[xxxii]

# HOW FCV IMPACTS A COUNTRY'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLIMATE-RELATED HAZARDS

**While climate change and climate-related hazards play important roles in contributing to FCV-related challenges, it is equally important to consider how dynamics related to FCV can limit a country's ability to respond effectively to climate change.**[xxxiii] Climate-related hazards can damage infrastructure and slow down economic growth, diverting limited government capacity and resources. These compounding effects often further undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of FCS governments while increasing social tensions and instability.[xxxiv]

**In turn, the need to divert resources and political attention to addressing the immediate impacts of costly climate-related hazards can weaken the capacity of governments and communities to respond to competing development priorities.** This vicious cycle underscores the need for actions that respond and adapt to climate change in fragile and conflict affected settings to be delivered in close coordination with wider sectoral activities ranging from those focused on addressing immediate humanitarian needs to longer development interventions.[xxxv]

**Evidence shows that FCV-related threats have several pathways through which they can limit the adaptive capacity of governments by weakening institutions and constraining capacity.** A country's ability to absorb climate stresses and shocks depends on the government's capacity to provide basic services. However, institutional capacity tends to be much weaker in FCV-affected settings with knock-on implications for a country's ability to respond to climate-related shocks and stresses.[xxxvi] Political instability has been found to reduce the ability of governments to effectively manage environmental resources and land use, as well as to prevent and respond to disasters,[xxxvii] while technical and resourcing constraints further limit the capacity of governments to fund and implement climate-related interventions at scale. Conflict generates large challenges that attract a significant amount of a government's attention and budgets.

**FCV can erode the social cohesion and potential for collective action that are fundamental to the resilience of local communities.** Many settings of FCV are characterized by weak governance, constrained access to services, and the social, political, and economic exclusion of marginalized groups or regions. These traits make development difficult by decreasing social sustainability–the feeling of inclusion by all people in the development process[xxxviii]—and can entrench poverty, limit people's livelihood possibilities, and reduce their capacity to cope with and recover from climate-related impacts and other shocks.[xxxix] Threats related to FCV can also contribute to

migration and displacement, which can put added pressure on resources and in some cases exacerbate tensions between displaced populations and host communities.[xl]

**An additional pathway through which FCV-related challenges can undermine adaptation is the fact that, during periods of high-intensity conflict or ongoing complex crises, governments often prioritize addressing immediate concerns, such as ensuring security and providing access to basic livelihood needs.** This often means that longer-term concerns, including the need to address multi-decadal impacts of climate change, are pushed down the political priority list. Climate action in these contexts is typically relegated to efforts that address climate-related extremes through disaster risk reduction or expansion of shock-responsive social protection systems. Even when there is political will to act on climate change more broadly, challenges related to FCV can limit rule of law, transparency, and accountability required to coordinate effective climate policies and interventions at scale.

## THE INFLUENCE OF CLIMATE ACTION ON FCV

**Actions taken to adapt or reduce exposure to climate shocks or to mitigate climate change will inherently have some effect on underlying FCV dynamics.** Any development or humanitarian intervention delivered in settings affected by FCV has the potential to influence the root drivers of FCV–positively or negatively. The potential for climate-related activities to have knock-on implications for FCV is especially present given the focus of many adaptation and mitigation investments on large-scale shifts in socio-economic and governance structures.

**Interactions between climate action and FCV can occur on two fronts.** On the one hand, FCV can undermine the implementation and effectiveness of adaptation and mitigation interventions by presenting significant political, economic and security-related obstacles to service delivery. On the other hand, failure to consider the impacts of planned climate actions on FCV drivers may lead to maladaptation—where climate action inadvertently increases vulnerability or triggers tensions that result in further conflict and violence.[xli]

**There are considerable social, political, and economic variables that need to be factored into the design and delivery of any adaptation and mitigation intervention, in addition to technical considerations.** It is important to note that climate actions

are rarely neutral–some groups and communities often benefit more than others, and delivery can exacerbate existing grievances, tensions, and inequities if not carefully factored into programming decisions.[xlii] The risks of maladaptation are especially high in contexts affected by FCV where any change in underlying norms, livelihood options or entitlements are likely to further exacerbate FCV challenges. For example, a study evaluating a series of adaptation projects delivered in Vanuatu over a thirty-year period found that climate-related interventions that did not address systemic inequalities and power relations as part of program design frequently led to maladaptive outcomes, including increased social tensions, competition and in some cases violence due to exacerbation of unequal power dynamics and further marginalization of vulnerability groups. These traits, in turn, led to a higher risk of project failure.[xliii, xliv]

**FCV environments are characterized by high levels of political and social uncertainty, with the potential for rapid changes in the context.** Effective actions must therefore build in adaptability and flexibility, to allow programs to respond to changes in their contexts without sacrificing gains. It also means that the risk of maladaptation can never be entirely removed given the fluidity of these contexts.[xlv] However, the likelihood of climate actions inadvertently contributing to negative outcomes can be significantly reduced by promoting basic principles of FCV-sensitivity. This means ensuring that interventions are not only conscious of the potential for escalation in FCV to undermine project outcomes, but take concrete steps to limit the impact of climate actions on exacerbating the underlying drivers of FCV. In the sections that follows, we shed light on key steps required to minimize the risk of maladaptation and promote FCV-sensitive action in a wide variety of fragile and conflict affected settings.

**For further information on the interactions between climate change and FCV, and insights into all three considerations listed in this chapter, we encourage readers to refer to the tools and guidance materials in Annex C, alongside the references mentioned.**

# B.

# A FRAMEWORK FOR DELIVERING FCV-SENSITIVE CLIMATE ACTION

## KEY MESSAGES

- We present a Framework for Promoting FCV-Sensitive Climate Action. The Framework serves as a guide for considering the implications of FCV when designing climate interventions and for factoring in potential impacts of climate actions on the drivers of FCV.
- The Framework can be used by technical and non-technical experts as a resource guide to promote FCV-sensitivity as part of analytics aimed at designing and supporting climate action or across a portfolio of climate-related investments, such as the World Bank's CCDRs and country programing. The framework helps to facilitate deeper and more informed conversations between operational staff and technical experts on designing FCV-sensitive climate action.
- The Framework consists of two core elements:
  - Applying common principles to promote FCV-sensitive climate action. This consists of five principles that apply to all FCV-affected contexts.
  - Tailoring climate actions to different FCV environments. This presents a taxonomy of illustrative FCV Characteristics, and suggested climate actions that respond to these conditions.
- The framework is designed to be practical and policy oriented. Questions are presented at the end of each section to help users identify key priorities and considerations each step of the way. References and resources to more in-depth sectoral analyses are also provided.

**Delivering effective climate action in FCV-affected settings is an urgent development challenge.**[xlvi] Despite the clear need for action, however, care must be taken to ensure that programming is sensitive to the unique needs and capacities of different FCV-affected environments.

**FCV-sensitive approaches can take many different forms, depending on the nature of the climate-related intervention and the FCV environment.** At its core, FCV-sensitive climate action seeks to reduce the risk of an intervention contributing to the underlying drivers of FCV and to limit the potential for FCV to stall climate (and development) outcomes. Simply put, FCV-sensitive approaches aim to ensure that climate actions "do no harm." As such, proposed climate actions should avoid worsening grievances and escalating tensions that increase vulnerability, diminish wellbeing, and exacerbate FCV threats. FCV-screening should consider how conflict and fragility will impact climate actions across several dimensions, including spillovers across spatial scales, over time, and between different social groups. Recognizing that FCV-affected settings come in many different forms, care must also be taken to tailor climate-related programming to different FCV settings, as what works in a setting affected by protracted civil conflict and recurrent crises may not be the same for a country facing institutional fragility with little risk of active conflict.

**As a guide on how to account for FCV in the design of climate programming, we present a novel Framework for FCV-Sensitive Climate Action.** The Framework consists of two distinct and sequential steps, starting with the application of common principles of FCV-sensitive climate action before seeking to tailor climate interventions to the unique needs and challenges facing the given FCV setting. Alongside details on how to implement each step, users are provided with guiding questions and key considerations that help to translate theory into practice. The Framework goes a step further than many existing tools and guidance that do not differentiate between different types of FCV-affected contexts by nuancing recommendations based on the differences between situations of fragility, conflict and violence.

**The Framework for FCV-Sensitive Climate Action builds on other core World Bank frameworks like the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) and FCV Strategy, as well as experiences gathered from experts across Global Practices and Regional Teams.** It also draws heavily on relevant Bank research and activities, including insights from the Social Dimensions of Climate Change initiative, the Social Sustainability Framework, the Defueling Conflict report, amongst others. Importantly, the Framework is in line with the Evolution Roadmap process, which seeks to ensure that the World Bank is responsive to global challenges–such as the compounding risks related to climate change and FCV alongside other threats such as pandemics, food insecurity, and macro-economic shocks. Note that the Framework is not limited to World Bank applications, and can be of use to planning and design of wider climate-related activities by other development organizations.

# HOW TO USE THE FRAMEWORK

**Before showcasing the various steps in the Framework, we first outline its purpose and how it should be used.** The Framework is a crucial starting point for ensuring climate programming accounts for overlapping climate and FCV-related dynamics. It is not a 'one-stop shop,' but offers broad, practical guidance for operating in FCV-affected contexts while shedding light on the complex interrelationships between climate change, climate-related hazards, and FCV–complexities that will need to be freshly grappled with for each program and at each stage of the program cycle. To support this, a set of questions is provided for each step in the Framework alongside references to additional materials and sector-specific tools.

**The Framework is meant for use by technical and non-technical experts–henceforth referred to as 'Users' or 'Teams'–in promoting FCV-sensitivity across a portfolio of climate-related investments or analytics, such as a Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR) or country engagement products.** It can also be used to inform the design of individual activities such as an ASA or stand-alone investment, though its guidance may have to be tailored accordingly. Users do not need to be experts in FCV to use the framework, but are encouraged to draw on further support and expertise from available sources such as the GCRP, FCV Country Coordinators and GP experts alongside additional tools and resources highlighted throughout the Report.

**The Framework follows two core steps.** Step 1 presents series of core things to consider in promoting FCV-affected settings that are applicable across any FCV environment. Applying these will help mitigate risks and ensure the program contributes to sustainable change and avoids aggravating existing tensions. Step 2 provides guidance on tailoring climate programming to different FCV contexts. It presents a range of FCV-affected contexts and useful advice for ensuring climate-related interventions are appropriate to the needs and threats facing each context.

**Further details on each step of the Framework are elaborated in the sections below.**

**FIGURE 4:**

## Framework for Promoting FCV-sensitive Climate Action

### Applying General Principles of FCV-sensitivity

Seek opportunities to promote to common principles for embedding FCV-sensitivity in proposed climate programming. Several things to consider are presented below, and can be thought of a minimum-standards for FCV-sensitive climate action and are applicable across all FCV settings. They include:

- Consider how climate actions affect drivers of FCV
- Mitigate risk of maladaptation
- Prioritize climate actions that address root causes of FCV, where possible
- Focus on needs & capacities of vulnerable regions & groups
- Encourage coordination across sectors and closer links between development

### Tailoring to Different FCV environments

Beyond applying the general principles, tailor climate interventions to address the specific dynamics of each FCV context. Customize actions to account for the unique vulnerabilities, capacities, and risks present in different FCV-affected environments. The framework offers targeted guidance and entry points for adapting programming to seven illustrative FCV scenarios.

- Ongoing conflict and crises
- Periodic FCV challenges
- Regional pockets of FCV
- Institutional & Social Fragility
- Non-state Violence
- Transboundary FCV-challenges
- FCV in SIDS and MICS

# 1. CONSIDERATIONS FOR ENSURING CLIMATE ACTION IS FCV SENSITIVE

**Delivering effective climate programming in FCV-affected settings relies on ensuring that proposed actions adhere to the basic principles of FCV-sensitivity.** There are several reasons for this. FCV can make designing and delivering climate-related interventions significantly more challenging. This is especially the case in conflict-affected contexts, where security concerns are high and ongoing crises can undermine basic development objectives. Moreover, poorly designed climate-related interventions can lead to maladaptation, exacerbating FCV risks and ultimately leaving targeted populations more vulnerable. Finally, if well designed, climate-related interventions can serve to strengthen communities more broadly, building resilience and peace–even if this is not the primary objective.

**To support effective country and regional investments in adaptation or mitigation, we outline five things to consider for promoting FCV-sensitive climate action.** These are aspects and good practices that should be incorporated into the design of proposed climate actions across all FCV-affected settings (though further tailoring will be required to account for unique FCV challenges, as described in Step II below). Each consideration is accompanied by a series of guiding questions and considerations that encourage users to explore key issues related to different aspects of FCV sensitivity. These can also help to identify critical knowledge gaps and issues that require follow-up support from FCV or climate related experts. Below we describe them in more detail.

FIGURE 5.

Things to consider in promoting FCV Sensitivity in any FCV environment



# 1.1 CONSIDER HOW CLIMATE AND FCV INTERACT, AND UNDERSTAND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON PROGRAM DELIVERY

**Effective climate programming depends on a comprehensive understanding of how climate programming and climate-related hazards are likely to interact within a given country or region.** Understanding this context is core to adopting an FCV sensitive approach. This is crucial not only to uncover the drivers of vulnerability, but also to identify how these drivers can exacerbate other sectoral challenges, such as food insecurity, disease outbreaks, and competition over scarce natural resources. Crucially, understanding context is necessary for ensuring that climate actions are tailored to the specific needs and opportunities of each FCV setting.

**Four lenses can be applied to develop a deeper understanding of a given context.**

## A. Identifying key climate impacts and vulnerabilities:

**Develop a clear picture of the present and future impacts of climate change**. This is particularly relevant in FCV-affected settings due to their unique vulnerability and the heightened potential for climate impacts to spill over across sectors and regions.

**Users should first consider the current effects and short-term consequences of climate change and climate-related hazards.** FCV-affected settings are often heavily impacted by heatwaves, droughts, floods, and severe storms. These have substantial economic impacts and threaten lives and livelihoods in contexts already challenged by responding to FCV and other sectors threats. Resources and toolkits that offer overviews of key climate-related hazards are a useful starting point. These include the World Bank's Think Hazard! database, EU's INFORM Risk Index, among others (see Appendix C for an extensive list). Relevant experts within and outside the World Bank are also important sources of information.

**Understanding the longer-term implications of climate change is also crucial.** Gradual increases in temperature and alterations in rainfall patterns will have profound consequences for many FCV-affected nations, impacting critical sectors such as agriculture, natural resource management, health and others. There are similarly many existing resources that can be used to inform assessments of climate change's multi-decadal impacts. The World Bank's Climate Change Knowledge Portal, for example, includes Climate Risk Country Profiles covering many IDA eligible and FCS countries. A further list of relevant resources is included in Appendix C.

**In developing a profile of climate risks, it is important to identify the regions, sectors, and social groups that are most vulnerable to climate shocks.** This requires going

beyond assessing hazards to understanding the broader socio-economic and political drivers of vulnerability. Factors such as low socio-economic development, unsustainable land use, poor governance, inequity and marginalization can amplify individual, regional, and sectoral vulnerability to climate change. Insights and literature from related sectors can be highly valuable for understanding the broader sectoral dimensions of vulnerability, including disaster risk management, social inclusion, poverty, among others. CCDRs and Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRA) are useful resources, when available.

## B. Uncovering the root causes and dynamics of FCV:

**People and communities are vulnerable to climate change and climate-related hazards not only because of the physical shocks and stresses they face, but also because of the wider socio-economic, cultural, and political factors that shape their capacity to adapt**. Understanding the root causes of FCV is key to identifying–and thus avoiding–actions that could lead to maladaptation.

**Understanding the unique factors that shape the nature and political economy of the country should be a priority.** This can be developed by drawing on existing data, literature, and expert guidance, where available. It may also be necessary, however, to commission dedicated research and analysis.

**FCV-affected settings are not homogeneous.** Challenges vary depending on the intensity, scale, and duration of a security situation, the levels and types of fragility and violence that are present, and the underlying development conditions in a given context. Efforts to understand FCV dynamics in a country or region are further complicated by the absence of common definitions and systems for classifying FCV. Various fragility assessments exist, including the OECD's State of Fragility framework, the Fragile States Index by the Fund for Peace, and the World Bank's FCS list (others are highlighted in Appendix C). While users are encouraged to draw on resources that are best suited to their needs, there are several characteristics that are common to many of these frameworks. Four features that are important to consider when trying to uncover the root causes of FCV in a given country or region (see Appendix B for examples of traits associated with these features):

i. Security: The degree to which the public is protected from violence, threats, and human rights violations.
ii. Governance Capacity: The extent to which government and other core stakeholders provide basic services and respond effectively to crises.
iii. Process Legitimacy2: The extent to which governing arrangements are accepted by the public and meaningfully serve them.
iv. Social Cohesion: The extent to which the public shares a sense of belonging, trust, and solidarity; and a willingness to cooperate among society, private sector and the government.

2 **For further insights on process legitimacy and social cohesion refer to the Social Sustainability Framework as outlined by Barron et al.** 2023.

**The four features above are not exhaustive, and simply point to some of the drivers of FCV that users should consider in understanding root causes of FCV (see Appendices A and B).** Irrespective of what framework is used, it is important to take stock of existing literature and resources available. In many cases, there will be relevant materials to draw on such as the World Bank's Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs), as well as reports from a wide variety of think tanks and international organizations. There are also various FCV-related datasets that can be used to examine historical trends, as well as differences across regional and social groups (see Appendix C for examples). In settings where existing literature is scant or the evidence base is inconclusive, teams can draw on other secondary sources of information or consider commissioning background studies. These activities should seek to fill important knowledge gaps and focus on uncovering the root causes of vulnerability and the pathways through which climate and FCV interact. Political Economy Analysis, alongside regional and sectoral case studies, can help to highlight the historical and political drivers of FCV, identify the key actors involved, and reveal the groups that are affected by climate and FCV interactions.

**Commissioned pieces can help identify the sectors (both public and private) that are most affected by climate and FCV threats, as well as the cultural and social factors that influence discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion.** FCV Country Coordinators can provide guidance on commissioning of research, particularly by pointing to gaps in existing knowledge and links with past or ongoing RRA exercises. FCV and Climate Change Groups, relevant Global Practices and IFC can also help identify relevant guidance or datasets and provide recommendations on external advisory services (including think tanks listed in Appendix C). It is important to remember, however, that carrying out primary research and commissioning background studies requires time, and care should be taken to initiate new research early on in the process.

## C. Exploring how FCV and climate change interact with and compound other sectoral threats:

**Another important lens is to explore compounding interactions between climate change, FCV, and wider sectoral threats.** To begin with, users are encouraged to explore the various pathways highlighted in Section A, including consideration of the ways in which climate change is likely to exacerbate the root causes of FCV in the country or region, as well as how FCV dynamics are likely to limit the capacity of national and local actors to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Appendix X describes a number of pathways through which climate and FCV may interact, alongside guiding questions and considerations in Box X that can be used to further unpack the two-way relationship between climate and FCV in a given setting.

**The impacts of climate change, climate-related hazards, and FCV are also likely to spill over and interact with other sectoral threats.** Food insecurity, natural resource degradation, energy access constraints, and macro-economic shocks are just some of the threats that can mediate the interactions between climate change and FCV. Crucially, these compounding effects can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of climate programming, particularly in settings affected by protracted FCV challenges. Drawing on a wide range of

cross-sectoral risk repositories, datasets, and literature will help with understanding which threats are most relevant. This includes resources such as the World Bank's ThinkHazard! database or the EU's INFORM Risk Index among many others. This can be supplemented by more detailed sector-specific resources and insights from Global Practice experts within the World Bank. For example, the Defueling Conflict report highlights a wide range of considerations needed in addressing overlapping natural resource management, climate change, and FCV-related threats. Fortunately, there is a growing body of literature that explores cross-sectoral impacts of climate-related threats in many FCV-affected countries that can be drawn on to further understand compounding interactions.[xlvii]

## D. Understanding the impacts of climate and FCV interactions on proposed climate actions–from design and delivery to outcomes that will be felt long after the program has ended.

**Drawing on insights gathered from Principle I described above, users can extend their analysis by seeking to understand how climate and FCV-related challenges could affect the delivery of proposed climate actions, as well as how adaptation and mitigation interventions may, in turn, contribute to root causes of FCV.** In doing so, users must consider the full life cycle of a program– including how climate and FCV-related threats (and their interactions) are likely to affect climate actions before, during, and after implementation. It also requires a careful screening of proposed program outcomes and deliverables as well as the various risks identified in project documentation such as those included in the Systematic Operations Risk-rating Tool (SORT) alongside other program-related risks identified. Users are encouraged to combine contextual information from Step 1 with information on program deliverables and risks to weigh the potential interactions between climate and FCV on proposed climate actions.

**A key element of this assessment is to identify relevant pathways that could escalate the impacts of climate and FCV threats on program outcomes (and vice versa).** This includes traits such as increased competition over natural resources, exacerbation of food insecurity, pressures linked to forced displacement, constraints of livelihood options or exacerbation of social exclusion, amongst many other features that are likely to impact on, or be influenced by, climate actions in a given country or region. Teams are encouraged to identify FCV triggers of relevance and seek to monitor them over time, as well as to identify options to mitigate or reduce their impacts on program delivery. The following box outlines a series of questions and key considerations that can support this analysis.

## Issues to Consider and Guiding Questions

Below we provide suggestions on the sorts of issues that Framework users may want to consider, alongside several guiding questions and resources related to each aspect of Principle 1: Consider how climate and FCV interact. Note that this list is by no means exhaustive, and should be complemented by other contextually relevant inputs and questions as needed.

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### 1. IDENTIFYING KEY CLIMATE IMPACTS AND VULNERABILITIES

- What are the current, observable impacts of climate change and climate-related hazards in the region/country of interest? What are the predicted short-term impacts? How might climate impacts shape FCV risk or climate programming?
- What are the projections for long-term climate impacts? What are the possible cascading or compound risks of climate change and how might they shape FCV risk or influence climate programming?
- What are key social, economic and political non-climatic vulnerabilities? How do climate impacts exacerbate or create new vulnerabilities?
- How might climate impacts (current, short term and long-term) impact the most important sectors and indicators?

### RELEVANT TOOLS AND RESOURCES:

- WBG Country Climate and Development Reports; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment Reports; ThinkHazard! Database on natural hazard risk; WB Climate Change Knowledge Portal

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### 2. UNCOVERING THE ROOT CAUSES AND DYNAMICS OF FCV

- What are the main sources and drivers of FCV in the context of concern? How have they evolved over time and across different levels (local, national, regional)?
- Who are the main actors and stakeholders involved or affected by FCV in the context? What are their interests, motivations, capacities, and relationships?
- What are the main impacts and consequences of FCV in the context? How do they affect different groups and communities, especially the poor and marginalized?
- Are there clear opportunities and challenges for addressing FCV in the context? What are the existing or potential entry points and windows of opportunity for promoting peace and resilience?

### QUESTIONS RELEVANT TO DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF FCV AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY

- **Security:** Is the area affected by violence, crime, or human rights violations? If so, how prevalent and intense are these issues? How do they affect different groups and communities? How effective are the mechanisms for conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding in the context?
- **Social cohesion:** How inclusive and participatory is social, economic, and political life in the context? How diverse and pluralistic is the context of interest? How are discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion prevented and managed? How strong are the social networks, associations, and movements that foster civic engagement, collective action, and social capital? How frequent and constructive is the dialogue, consultation, and feedback between state and society, and among different groups and communities?
- **Governance capacity:** How available and adequate are the physical, human, and financial resources for delivering public services in the context of interest? How efficient and effective are the public service delivery systems, processes, and standards? How aligned are they with the needs and preferences of the population? How prepared and resilient are the public service delivery to cope with shocks and crises?
- **Process Legitimacy:** How representative and participatory are the political processes and institutions in the context of interest? How accountable and transparent are the governing institutions and actors? How responsive and inclusive are the governing institutions and actors to the needs and demands of the population, especially the poor and marginalized? How adherent and compliant are the governing institutions and actors with the rule of law, human rights, and democratic principles?

### RELEVANT TOOLS AND RESOURCES:

- World Bank's Risk and Resilience Analysis (RRAs) and Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) reports, alongside other sectoral WBG analyses; The Social Sustainability Framework (Barron et al. 2023) International Crisis Group Crisis Watch briefs; ACAPS data on crisis-affected contexts; ACLED data on political violence and battle-related deaths (see Appendix C for further resources).

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## 3. EXPLORING HOW FCV AND CLIMATE CHANGE INTERACT AND COMPOUND OTHER SECTORAL THREATS

- Which broader sectors and sectoral risks are likely to exert influence on the dynamics of climate and FCV in the given context? Users might want to consider past interactions among climate, FCV, and other sectoral threats as a guiding
- Are there particular sectoral threats that are more relevant in dictating climate and FCV-related impacts–including risks related to health, agriculture, natural resource management, social inclusion, energy, infrastructure and others? Under what circumstances are compounding interactions most likely and how do they exacerbate climate and FCV-related threats?

- Based on experience of past threats (or knowledge of newly emerged threats), what are the implications of cross-sectoral dimensions of climate and FCV? For example: are there instances where addressing one sectoral risk might inadvertently exacerbate FCV or climate vulnerability; are there certain social groups or regions that are affected most; what wider sectoral conditions serve to exacerbate (or reduce) climate and FCV-related threats?
- What are the main plans/policies and who are the key stakeholders involved in addressing wider sectoral threats of relevance to climate and FCV–including national government, civil society, private sector as well as development and humanitarian actors?
- Are mechanisms in place to promote coordination of cross-sectoral risks at the national level and are there existing programs or policies aimed at addressing cross-sectoral risks that can be leveraged?

**RELEVANT TOOLS AND RESOURCES:**

- WBG Risk and Resilience Assessments; International Crisis Group Crisis Watch briefs; ACAPS data on crisis-affected contexts; ACLED data on political violence and battle-related deaths (see Appendix C for further resources)

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**UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE AND FCV INTERACTIONS ON PROPOSED CLIMATE ACTIONS**

- What are the main drivers of FCV in the areas where proposed climate actions will take place? How do they relate to the root causes of conflict, violence, and fragility at the country or regional level?
- How will the climate actions affect or be affected by the FCV drivers before, during, and after implementation? What are the potential positive or negative impacts of the climate actions on FCV drivers and vice versa? How can these impacts be measured or monitored?
- What are the relevant triggers that could escalate or exacerbate climate and FCV-related impacts on program delivery? How likely or frequent are they to occur? How can they be detected or prevented? What are the possible mitigation or response strategies to reduce their impacts?

**RELEVANT TOOLS AND RESOURCES:**

- Cao et al. 2021. Exploring the conflict blind spots of climate adaptation finance. SPARC. Available here
- Adelphi. 2021. Addressing climate-fragility risks: Guidance Note. Adelphi. Available here
- Schaik et al. 2019. Making Peace with Climate, Background Paper for the Global Commission on Adaptation. Available here

## 1.2. MITIGATE THE RISK OF CLIMATE ACTIONS RESULTING IN MAL-ADAPTATION

**In contexts affected by FCV, the risk of climate actions leading to negative outcomes is significantly heightened.** Such adverse outcomes can increase vulnerabilities among target groups, exacerbate existing tensions, and even generate new FCV-related concerns in non-beneficiaries and neighboring communities.

### Snapshot: Modelling land-use and urban growth scenarios in the West Bank and Gaza

In developing the 2023 Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR), the Bank's CCDR Team modeled a series of scenarios–from continued fragility, to increased resilience, and toward sustainability–that mapped out potential actions that could avoid maladaptive pathways and future climate risks. The WB&G CCDR acknowledges the limits on actions given restrictions and conflict risks faced by Palestinian communities, while looking to the future by modeling land use, urban growth, and resource availability under various pathways to mitigate the risk of maladaptation. This anticipatory approach attempts to do no harm by offering a palette of options under various scenarios: these options included identifying key geographic areas and urban sites that, if not planned in a manner that factors in climate impacts, might expose communities to increasing risk and lock in certain exposure. The process of forecasting for different scenarios helps policymakers, implementing partners, local authorities and communities themselves anticipate changes in the situation, mitigate future risks and avoid maladaptive patterns of growth.[xlviii]

The importance of adopting a flexible scenario-based approach to climate programming in a setting like West Bank and Gaza was further underscored by evolving FCV conditions. Indeed, just weeks after finalizing the CCDR in September 2023 prolonged conflict between Israel and Hamas broke out in early October. The implications of the war have had considerable impacts on prospects for promoting climate action in the region–including the cessation of core CCDR-related objectives. The example underscores the importance of consider rapid changes in FCV conditions on delivery of climate action, and the potential for maladaptive outcomes in failing to do so. It also highlights the need for close coordination and partnerships between development and humanitarian communities in supporting climate and FCV-related objectives–discussed in more detail later on in the Framework.

**To effectively mitigate these risks, teams should ensure that climate interventions incorporate proactive measures and safeguards at all stages of programming.** While the specific steps to avoid maladaptation will vary depending on each context, four factors are largely universal and important to consider in evaluating outcomes from proposed climate actions. These include:

i. **Adopt a 'do-no-harm' approach: Interventions should minimize negative impacts on the underlying drivers of FCV.** They should avoid triggering tensions, eroding trust, and exacerbating ongoing conflicts and violence. Many of the principles and guiding questions outlined in this framework encompass aspects of the 'do-no-harm' approach, though the exact implementation will depend heavily on local contexts (see suggested resources below for further guiding principles).

ii. **Avoid short term 'lock-ins': There are often trade-offs between the short-term and long-term objectives of climate actions in FCV-affected settings.** For instance, regions grappling with ongoing conflict may prioritize short-term activities to reduce disaster risks, overlooking longer-term measures to adapt to changing temperatures and rainfall patterns. Striking a balance is necessary, especially in countries facing severe FCV-related threats. However, care must be taken to avoid creating 'lock-ins'–where the short-term outcomes of a project constrain future options and limit the flexibility in the choice of alternative development pathways. Examples include the construction of critical infrastructure that does not adequately account for future changes in temperature or rainfall patterns, or heavy investment in the promotion of livelihoods that may be ill-suited to future climate or macro-economic conditions with little consideration of support needed to transition and adapt. Such trade-offs should be carefully considered when designing and delivering climate interventions (see Step 3 for additional insights into tailoring short-term and long-term trade-offs in different FCV settings).

iii. **Anticipate change: FCV-affected contexts are characterized by uncertainty, both in the short and long term, and political and socio-economic conditions can change rapidly and unpredictably.** Many climate-related programs operate on a timescale of three to five years, with many focused on supporting adaptation and mitigation over much longer time periods. Careful attention needs to be paid to how a sudden escalation in FCV-related threats will impact program delivery. It is also important to ensure that climate-related programs do not further escalate FCV in the face of new or rapidly evolving threats (such as social unrest or tensions between regions). Risks can be further minimized by identifying future scenarios, and associated contingencies, in the design of climate interventions. Programming can also benefit from the use of FCV triggers, drawing on real-time monitoring, that signal the need for course correction and contingency plans (including datasets identified in **Appendix C.** Above all, flexibility and adaptability should be built into the design and programming of climate activities, to account for a rapidly evolving FCV context.

iv. **Engaging beneficiaries in design and delivery: Ensuring the active inclusion of local communities in development and implementation processes is critical, as is collaboration with local communities and others who will contribute to and benefit**

**from interventions.**[xlix] is imperative. This inclusive approach facilitates a deeper understanding of their specific needs, concerns, and priorities. It also helps guard against outcomes being poorly suited to local cultural and socio-economic contexts. Identifying vulnerable and marginalized groups that may be disproportionately affected by climate actions is crucial. Recognizing these groups will enable targeted efforts to protect their interests and well-being.

**Further considerations and guidance on avoiding maladaptation are detailed below, alongside the framework's other core principles.**

## Issues to Consider and Guiding Questions

- How will the proposed climate actions affect or be affected by the FCV drivers before, during, and after implementation?
- Has the Team sought to identify measures to minimize negative impacts on the underlying drivers of FCV and avoid triggering tensions or exacerbating ongoing conflicts or violence?
- Has the Team considered trade-offs between short–and long-term objectives of the climate intervention? Are proposed climate actions likely to result in 'lock-in' that could jeopardize the sustainability of livelihoods and economy activities in the longer-term?
- What are the relevant triggers that could escalate or exacerbate climate and FCV-related impacts on program delivery? How likely or frequent are they to occur? How can they be detected or prevented?
- What contingency planning and flexibility measures should be in place to prevent heightened FCV conditions from jeopardizing the delivery of climate-related actions?
- Has the Team made use of scenario and contingency planning to consider the impacts of future FCV outcomes? Have relevant triggers and real-time monitoring systems been put in place to guide course correction?

### TOOLS AND RESOURCES

- Magnan and Mainguy. 2014. Avoiding maladaptation to climate change: towards guiding principles. Sapiens. Available here
- Reckien et al. 2023. Navigating the continuum between adaptation and maladaptation. Nature Climate Change. Available here
- Regilience. 2023. The REGILIENCE self-assessment tool to spot risks of maladaptation. Available here
- Vivekananda, J. 2020. Climate, conflict and crises: first and foremost, do no harm. ICRC. Available here

## 1.3. PRIORITIZE CLIMATE PROGRAMMING THAT ADDRESSES FCV ROOT CAUSES AND ENHANCES THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACEBUILDING

**FCV-sensitive climate action should look for opportunities to address the root causes of FCV and ways to support peacebuilding, even if it means supporting activities that are not explicitly labeled as 'climate action.'** This principle rests on the premise that understanding the root causes of FCV is essential for designing effective and context-specific climate programming in FCV settings. Without such an understanding, climate actions may inadvertently worsen the situation or miss opportunities to enhance resilience.

### Snapshot: Sustainable Low Carbon Development in Colombia

In Colombia, after decades of conflict between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 2016 peace agreement included clauses that specifically addressed environmental protection and access. In Orinoquia region, where there was a strong FARC presence, project teams developed interventions that consciously targeted sectors identified as highly relevant to peacebuilding priorities and the fulfillment of the peace agreement. In working to control and counter deforestation, projects were designed to reduce illegal land acquisition in order to mitigate land-related conflict, and to contribute over time to reducing disparities between rural and urban areas through sustainable land management.[l]

**Moreover, climate actions can help tackle the drivers of FCV and build the foundations for peace, if they are designed and implemented with caution and sensitivity.** For instance, climate actions can help to resolve natural resource conflicts by building trust and confidence in local and national institutions while simultaneously addressing climate change and climate-related hazards. Likewise, where certain groups are excluded from power and resources, climate actions can empower them by including them in local decision making and co-developing programming. Additionally, where corruption by certain powerful groups has been an underlying cause of conflict, transparency and accountability in climate actions, along with local bottom-up planning, are paramount. In addition, climate actions can also contribute to the peacebuilding process by fostering dialogue and trust among conflicting groups, enhancing dispute resolution systems, supporting participatory and inclusive decision making, and advancing gender equity.

**However, it is important to note that climate actions should not be seen as a substitute for broader efforts to address FCV-related challenges.** Many climate-related interventions will have no direct link to FCV issues, and FCV-sensitive programming does not imply sacrificing adaptation and mitigation outcomes for peace and development objectives. Rather, it means looking for possible synergies and co-benefits, and prioritizing climate actions that also address the root causes of FCV.

**Programming should aim to align climate actions with national and local capacities, plans, and peacebuilding efforts.** Peacebuilding efforts must recognize the linkages between FCV and climate change, and how and why these linkages are important for security and long-term peace. Climate actions (even if not labeled as such) must be aligned, coordinated, and integrated with peacebuilding priorities. Peacebuilding and reconstruction activities should never increase vulnerability to climate impacts nor undermine resilience. At the same time, it is important that climate actions are embedded within national development and poverty alleviation plans. They should support countries to achieve their development goals in ways that are green, resilient, and inclusive. As interactions between FCV and climate can impede delivery and exacerbate wider sectoral risks, ensuring FCV issues are fully considered is vital. Finally, programming needs to ensure that national and local capacities–which are often low in FCV settings–are sufficient for supporting proposed climate actions. Investing in technical and financial capacity, especially at the local level, may be needed.

## Issues to Consider and Guiding Questions

- What are the root causes of FCV in the country or region where the climate project or portfolio is being implemented or planned? How does the climate project or portfolio address or interact with these root causes of FCV?
- What are the potential co-benefits or trade-offs of the climate project or portfolio for tackling FCV drivers and supporting peacebuilding (if any)?
- Can climate interventions be designed and implemented in a way that avoids exacerbating tensions or entrenching existing power relations and structural drivers of vulnerability?
- Are there opportunities for climate action to foster dialogue and trust among conflicting groups, enhance dispute resolution systems, support participatory and inclusive decision making, and advance gender equity?
- How does the climate project or portfolio complement or align with broader efforts to address FCV-related challenges?

### TOOLS AND RESOURCES

- Crawford et al. 2022. Building Peace and Climate Resilience: Aligning peacebuilding and climate adaptation in fragile states. International Institute for Sustainable Development. Accessible here
- Tanzler et al. 2018. Building resilience by linking climate change adaptation, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Adelphi. Accessible here
- Melgar et al. 2023. A tool for mainstreaming peacebuilding in climate-adaptation efforts: evidence and processes. Accessible here

## 1.4. CLIMATE PROGRAMMING SHOULD PRIORITIZE THE NEEDS AND CAPACITIES OF VULNERABLE REGIONS AND GROUPS

**Climate change, climate-related hazards, and FCV affect different regions and social groups in different ways.** Certain populations–such as women, children, impoverished communities, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples–are more susceptible to the adverse impacts than others. The most vulnerable often bear a disproportionate burden of climate-related challenges, facing greater economic and social hardships. Climate action should therefore be designed and delivered to ensure that their needs are adequately accounted for.

### Snapshot: Gender-responsive approaches in Sudan

In North Kordofan, tensions over access to land and water between pastoralist, farming, and displaced communities have been partially addressed through the development of alternative natural resource-based livelihood and conflict mediation approaches that intentionally advance the participation of women in community dialogues and farming cooperatives.

These projects, which aimed to contribute to peacebuilding while ensuring the participation of marginalized members of different communities, have also contributed to changing perceptions and attitudes towards women's participation in natural resource management. This approach has helped to preserve and manage resources in settings affected by conflict, climate, and environmental stressors.[li]

**Climate programming needs to not only prevent further marginalization but also to actively incorporate the perspectives and requirements of the most vulnerable regions and groups throughout the climate programming process.** This requires meaningful participation and prioritization of these communities at all stages of climate-related initiatives, from design to delivery. It also requires safeguards to ensure that outcomes from adaptation and mitigation activities do not exacerbate the FCV-related challenges that vulnerable regions and groups face.

**To promote the needs and capacities of vulnerable groups and regions, climate programming should consider three elements:**

- Engage vulnerable regions and groups in designing and delivering climate actions. Efforts must be made to identify and engage with vulnerable regions and social

groups most affected by both climate change and FCV. This must go beyond the areas targeted by proposed climate actions to include neighboring regions that may be affected by spillovers. The inclusion and participation of vulnerable communities are essential to ensuring that their voices are heard, as well as to integrating their unique knowledge and experiences in the design of climate initiatives. Engagement should be carried out at all stages, from design to delivery and evaluation. Particular care needs to be taken in settings where marginalized groups have been deliberately kept out of national or local decision-making processes, where there has been a history of such behavior–especially common in settings affected by prolonged FCV-related challenges.

- Ensure climate action addresses the needs of vulnerable groups and regions. In practice, this means that vulnerable and marginalized groups should not be left behind, and that climate actions are tailored to addressing the unique barriers and challenges they face.
- Consider how climate actions impact marginalized groups. Climate actions are unlikely to benefit all groups and regions equally. This is especially the case in FCV-affected settings, where there may be regional or ethnic power imbalances, with marginalized groups often left out of decision-making spaces. It is crucial that climate-related interventions pay close attention to ensure that the wellbeing of people from marginalized groups is not compromised.

## Issues to Consider and Guiding Questions

- Have efforts been made to identify and engage with vulnerable regions and groups affected by FCV and climate-related hazards in areas supported by proposed climate actions–including such women, children, impoverished communities, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples? Have they had the chance to integrate their knowledge into proposed climate actions where appropriate?
- Do proposed climate actions address the unique needs and capacities of vulnerable regions and groups? Does climate programming empower and strengthen the capacity of the most vulnerable and marginalized?
- Has the design of climate actions factored in the unique capacities, resources and livelihoods on which those most vulnerable depend and sought to ensure that they are not negatively impacted by proposed interventions?

**TOOLS AND RESOURCES:**

- WRI. 2014. How Can Adaptation Finance Help the Most Vulnerable Communities? World Resources Institute. Accessible here
- UNFCCC. 2018. Considerations regarding vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems in the context of the national adaptation plans. Accessible here
- Taylor et al. 2022. Putting 'vulnerable groups' at the center of adaptation interventions by promoting transformative adaptation as a learning process. NORAD. Accessible here

## 1.5. ENCOURAGE COORDINATION ACROSS DEVELOPMENT, DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT, HUMANITARIAN, AND PEACEBUILDING ACTORS TO LIMIT IMPACTS ON CLIMATE AND FCV

**Encouraging coordination and alignment with relevant sectoral stakeholders is a key element of FCV-sensitive climate action.** This includes, among others, those engaged in disaster risk management, natural resource management, humanitarian response, and peacebuilding. Doing so is imperative because the consequences of climate change and FCV often transcend boundaries and interact with broader sectoral challenges, necessitating cohesive responses from diverse actors.

### Snapshot: Partnering to improve the resilience of water systems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

In Goma, the capital of the conflict-affected province of North Kivu in the DRC, half of the population accesses water via unreliable and unsafe sources. Reliable water service is severely restricted, and has struggled to keep up with the increase in the city's population due to the arrival of people internally displaced by conflict. As part of the Access Governance Reform for the Electricity and Water (Eau) Sectors project, the World Bank is working with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, GIZ, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the Fondation Lombard Odier to design, build, and implement a master plan for expansion and maintenance of a municipal water system.

The project builds on the knowledge, expertise, and presence of humanitarian and development agencies to advance the goals of the DRC and the World Bank to increase the resilience of water systems and improve people's access to essential services.[liii] Partnering with the ICRC, a humanitarian organization that works in a neutral, impartial, and independant manner and has experience, expertise, and a mandate to work in situations of conflict and violence, allows access to relevant local actors in situations which might otherwise be challenging to reach for the World Bank. The project leverages the skillsets of actors across different sectors present in these situations to expand access to communities in need, and address climate risks in areas with limited adaptation and governance capacity.

**The foundation for promoting such coordination begins with understanding the intricate interactions between climate change, climate-related hazards, and FCV, as well as the potential for spillover effects into other sectors.** Much of this can be gathered from the insights presented in Step 1 of this Framework. Equipped with this knowledge, teams should then delve into how climate actions are likely to be influenced by, and contribute to, broader sectoral challenges and policy responses, and vice versa. For instance, an adaptation intervention to manage increasing risks of flooding can concurrently enhance agricultural yields, thereby positively impacting livelihoods and reinforcing resilience.[liii] Peacebuilding efforts can enhance climate action by strengthening social cohesion and promoting responsible natural resource management.[liv] Addressing FCV and climate change transcends the confines of the two primary sectors and is significantly influenced by a broader array of cross-sectoral dynamics.

**Teams should go beyond understanding the cross-sectoral dimensions of climate and FCV to promote active coordination and engagement with relevant stakeholders.** This includes those involved in humanitarian relief, peacebuilding disaster risk, and natural resource management, as well as others relevant to the given context. This presents an opportunity to harness co-benefits, where actions or investments in one domain yield positive outcomes in another. Furthermore, it avoids duplicating activities and disputes over mandates, which are common challenges in addressing climate-related issues.

**Coordination can take many forms and is contingent on the nature of the proposed climate action and the context in which it operates.** Often, it involves establishing cross-sectoral working groups, communities of practice, and knowledge-sharing platforms to facilitate the exchange of insights and information regarding relevant activities and operations. It is important to consider trade-offs in the design and implementation of climate-related interventions. Substantial overlaps exist between activities linked to development, disaster risk management, humanitarian response, peacebuilding strategies, and climate change. Even if not their explicit aim, interventions that address poverty alleviation, education improvement, infrastructure development, healthcare access, and environmental protection can all bolster the adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities. In other scenarios, wider sectoral activities may inadvertently undermine people's adaptive capacity. Therefore, careful consideration is vital when designing climate-related interventions, taking into account the cascading implications and the processes for ongoing coordination with other sectoral activities. This is particularly relevant in FCV-affected contexts, where the landscape of development and humanitarian actors involved can be complex and overlapping, often with intertwined mandates and responsibilities.

## Issues to Consider and Guiding Questions

- Are there potential spillover effects of climate change and FCV into other sectors, and if so, what are they? What wider sectoral activities are likely to influence the delivery of proposed climate actions, and in turn, how will climate action influence other development and humanitarian activities?
- Have relevant stakeholders from sectors like humanitarian relief, peacebuilding, disaster risk management, and natural resource management been engaged and actively involved in the design of proposed climate actions?
- What efforts have been made to promote cross-sectoral collaboration between relevant sectoral actors? Are cross-sectoral working groups, communities of practice, or knowledge-sharing platforms established to facilitate information exchange and collaboration?
- Are there mechanisms in place to prevent duplication of activities and disputes over mandates, which can be common issues in addressing climate-related challenges?
- How can coordination mechanisms ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities among different stakeholders? How can potential trade-offs between climate action and other sectoral priorities be addressed or mitigated?
- What strategies can be employed to ensure that climate-related interventions do not inadvertently undermine the adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities in FCV-affected settings?

**TOOLS AND RESOURCES:**

- WB. 2023. Defueling Conflict. Environment and Natural Resource Management as a Pathway to Peace. World Bank. Accessible here
- England, M et al. 2018. Climate change adaptation and cross-sectoral policy coherence in southern Africa. Regional Environmental Change. Accessible here
- NDC. Mainstreaming climate change adaptation into sectoral planning: learning from Benin´s environmental cells. NDC Partnership. Accessible here

# 2. TAILORING CLIMATE PROGRAMMING TO DIFFERENT FCV CONTEXTS

**While the principles of FCV-sensitive climate action presented above are universally relevant, it's important to recognize that fragile and conflict-affected settings are not homogenous.** Each context presents distinct threats and opportunities, and effective climate programming must reflect this diversity. The next step in this Framework offers guidance on tailoring climate action to meet the unique challenges posed by different FCV contexts.

**Contextualizing climate action is essential because the unique drivers of FCV and capacities of a given setting will inevitably shape what forms of climate action are feasible and how climate-related interventions should be prioritized.** For example, as challenges related to insecurity deepen in a country, the focus of a government (or development agency) may naturally shift toward prioritizing more urgent humanitarian needs or disaster risk reduction, making it harder to address long-term climate risks. However, even in the most volatile environments, there are pathways to integrate climate sensitivity into interventions like disaster risk reduction, safety nets, and essential services. Conversely, FCV settings that are primarily characterized by institutional fragility, with limited risk of conflict, often present opportunities for more holistic climate programming by leveraging the higher institutional capacity of core government agencies, more advanced public financial management systems and even engagement of the private sector. Understanding these nuances and adapting FCV-sensitive responses accordingly allows for more effective and tailored climate action.

**Recognizing the varied nature of FCV challenges across and within countries, this Framework goes beyond general principles to highlight five illustrative characteristics of FCV.** These characteristics, drawn from the FCV Strategy, range from high-intensity conflict zones to areas with institutional fragility and transboundary conflict spillovers, helping to frame the specific risks and capacities at play in different settings.

**The characteristics highlighted in the figure represent the primary and distinguishing features that define FCV in a given country.** A single country may experience multiple characteristics simultaneously, each shaped by similar underlying structural factors and drivers. While these characteristics illustrate the tangible, on-the-ground realities that influence the design and feasibility of climate interventions, the structural factors and drivers of FCV explain why such conditions arise in the first place. Understanding both layers is vital for tailoring climate action that not only meets immediate needs, but also addresses the deeper root causes of fragility, conflict, and violence.

**FIGURE 6.**

Examples of common FCV characteristics that can influence the nature and delivery of climate action




The graphic illustrates common characteristics of FCV. These characteristics are overlapping and illustrative, rather than strictly sequential. The sizes of the elements generally indicate a trend from less to more common occurrences, though this pattern is not universally applicable.

**For each characteristic, the Framework details common challenges, the barriers that these challenges pose to effective programming, and recommended responses for overcoming them.** Key issues and guiding questionnaire outlined in a summary table presented below. These resources go above and beyond the generic principles in Element I of the Framework, providing high-level support to World Bank Task Teams and sectoral experts to better understand key considerations that should be considered across the spectrum of FCV-related contexts.

**The information summarized in Table 1 is further broken down into several themes.** We describe common contexts in each of the five sets of characteristics (Column I of the table). These are hypothetical and not exhaustive but are intended to illustrate some of the FCV-related challenges that are experienced in various environments. Drawing on the four categories used to describe root causes of FCV outlined in Chapter 1 earlier, we outline several common challenges associated with Security, Social Cohesion, Governance Capacity and Legitimacy concerns.

**The table also describes how FCV-related threats can impede effective climate action (Column II).** These are similarly grouped by common barriers, including those that limit Access and Delivery. This includes factors that prevent development and humanitarian actors from maintaining a physical presence and engagement with targeted communities affected by FCV, as well as barriers that limit the delivery of financial and technical support required to promote climate-related interventions. Barriers are also grouped into factors impeding Coordination and Engagement. This recognizes the importance of inclusive decision making and engagements between funder, implementing agencies and local communities in delivering climate action in FCV environments.

**Finally, the table summarizes several opportunities for promoting FCV-sensitivity tailored to each of the five sets of FCV characteristics (Column III).** Given the breadth of potential entry points, these are similarly grouped into factors that support more effective Planning and Risk Assessment–recognizing the importance of having better awareness of climate and FCV risks and how to address them strategically. Opportunities are also clustered into those that promote Cross-Sectoral Alignment and Cooperation. This similarly recognizes the importance of promoting stronger links between important stakeholders including government, civil society and community-based organizations, development and humanitarian actors.

**It is important to underscore that these five sets of characteristics are themselves highly generalized and often overlapping.** Countries rarely fit only one of set, and different sets often co-exist within the same country. The recommendations associated with each set are broad, enabling teams to identify high level entry points based on insights from similar country contexts. Teams will need to follow up with country-specific guidance and expertise in tailoring FCV-sensitive recommendations, including insights from FCV Country Coordinators and GP experts. Despite these caveats, insights from this conceptual framework can serve to facilitate more meaningful conversations as to how to ensure the threats, capacities and needs unique to each country are factored into the design of climate-related programming.

**TABLE 1.**

Examples of barriers and Recommendations to promoting FCV-sensitive climate action broken down by various illustrative FCV grouping

ILLUSTRATIVE FCV CHARACTERISTIC

## High-Intensity Conflict

| | |
|---|---|
| SECURITY | Armed conflict is intense, with significant direct casualties. National government is directly involved. |
| SOCIAL COHESION | Low levels of social cohesion and trust within and between FCV-affected communities |
| GOVERNANCE CAPACITY | Government capacity focused on the conflict, and is extremely compromised in delivery of services, especially in areas directly affected by conflict and violence |
| LEGITIMACY | In some cases, where conflict is internal, government legitimacy is very low due to explicit targeting of marginalized groups or regions. In some cases, government legitimacy remains high due to support for the government's efforts to end conflict. |

COMMON BARRIERS

### Access and Delivery

- Governments and other actors such as armed groups and militias may restrict access to certain areas and resources under security premises, stalling delivery of climate-related interventions and preventing access to key development and humanitarian actors.
- The need for short-term security may take precedence over long-term climate action, making it challenging to mobilize resources and political will.
- Destruction of infrastructure and disruption of supply chains due to conflict can hinder the delivery of climate action.
- Compromised services and damaged infrastructure can limit access to basic services such as water, sanitation, and healthcare, exacerbating the impacts of climate change and climate-related hazards on vulnerable populations.
- Very high potential for climate action to exacerbate ongoing conflict and social tensions. Notable risk of maladaptation.

### Engagement and Coordination

- The lack of interest from the government in climate action, and in situations of internal conflict, tensions between central authorities and others can prevent cooperation and coordination between key stakeholders in the delivery of climate action in FCV-affected areas.
- Government often involved in the conflict (directly or indirect) making it difficult for development and humanitarian actors to engage with them in the delivery of adaptation and mitigation objectives
- Marginalized groups and regions often under-represented in decision making for climate action

## High-Intensity Conflict *Continued*

### Other

- Displacement of people due to conflict or natural hazards can exacerbate social tensions and place added strain on public services.

EXAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS

### Recognizing unique FCV challenges and risks

- Monitor and adapt to changes in the conflict or crisis situation that may affect the delivery or outcomes of climate actions.
- Balance trade-offs between short-term stabilization and long-term resilience-building and consider how climate actions can support both objectives in the context of ongoing conflict or crisis.
- Identify and leverage opportunities to address the root causes or drivers of FCV through climate actions, such as reducing resource scarcity or competition, enhancing social cohesion, or supporting inclusive governance.
- Assess potential impacts of proposed climate actions on ongoing conflicts or crises and avoid or mitigate the risk of negative effects including aggravating ongoing conflict
- Consider how challenges related to forced displacement and refugees are likely to impact proposed climate actions, and seek aligned with national strategies to support displaced populations

### Cross-sectoral alignment and cooperation:

- Align climate actions with disaster risk management, crisis response, and peace-building activities to enhance resilience and stability across different sectors and levels of intervention.
- Coordinate and integrate climate actions with existing humanitarian and development programs to ensure a comprehensive and effective response to the needs and priorities of the affected populations.

ILLUSTRATIVE FCV CHARACTERISTIC

# Contested Territories

| | |
|---|---|
| SECURITY | Much of the country may be stable, though security risks may be present in some areas not under the control of the central authorities. |
| SOCIAL COHESION | Long-standing inequalities and marginalization of certain groups. |
| GOVERNANCE CAPACITY | Mixed capacity to deliver climate action. Often much lower capacity in areas not under the control of the government. |
| LEGITIMACY | Capacity and legitimacy vary considerably from region to region, and between local, national and de facto authorities. |

## COMMON BARRIERS

### Access and Delivery

- Challenges for delivery of climate action in areas or regions where the government has limited or no control, especially if non-state actors such as gangs or militias oppose or obstruct climate action.
- The presence of armed groups in areas outside the control of the government can create a security risk for the delivery of climate action and hinder progress.
- These regions may have weaker governance structures, technical capacity, and resources, making it challenging to implement and enforce climate policies.
- In some cases, basic public services are delivered by non-state actors, particularly in regions where violence is widespread.

### Engagement and Coordination

- Difficulties in engaging with or representing the needs and interests of communities or groups that are affected by or involved in non-state violence, especially if they lack trust or legitimacy in the eyes of the government or other stakeholders.
- These regions may have limited representation in decision-making processes for climate action, leading to a lack of consideration for their unique needs and challenges.

### Other

- High risk of exacerbating or triggering non-state violence due to climate-related impacts, especially if they increase competition or conflict over scarce or valuable resources such as land, water, or energy.
- In turn, climate actions have the potential to exacerbate non-state violence if safeguards are not put in place. This includes tensions related to intra-household and gender-based implications of adaptation and mitigation actions.
- Climate-related disasters may exacerbate existing tensions and conflicts in these regions, making it challenging to prioritize climate action.

## EXAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS

### Planning and Risk Assessment

- Consider the potential for FCV threats to spillover into neighboring regions/areas and their implications for delivering climate action

## Contested Territories *Continued*

- Ensure climate actions are inclusive of the unique capacities and needs of contested regions – particularly in instances where conflict-affected regions are marginalized or suppressed.
- Leverage climate actions that address the drivers of FCV and promote peace in the regions affected by insecurity
- Ensure that climate action initiatives are inclusive and equitable, and contribute to building social cohesion and resilience across different regions where possible
- Ensure that climate programming includes efforts to monitor and evaluate the impact of climate action initiatives on non-state violence (and vice-versa), and identifies relevant indicators to measure

### Cross-sectoral alignment and cooperation:

- Identify opportunities to support dialogue, trust and cooperation through climate action between and within regions affected by FCV
- Work with local communities and community-based organizations to address the root causes of non-state violence, such as poverty, social exclusion, and gender inequality, to ensure climate action is integrated into such efforts
- Identify local climate champions and non-state actors that support climate action conflict-affected regions

ILLUSTRATIVE FCV CHARACTERISTIC

# Protracted and/or Periodic Conflict

| | |
|---|---|
| SECURITY | Armed conflict and/or insecurity escalate periodically such as during election cycles or seasonally. |
| SOCIAL COHESION | Relatively low levels of cohesion due to the persistence of FCV threats over time. |
| CAPACITY | Decent capacity to deliver public services, including climate action. However, this is severely reduced during escalation of FCV or in regions affected by FCV. Security concerns often dominate policy priorities. |
| LEGITIMACY | Politicians are often actively involved in stirring tensions, particularly with regards to marginalized regions or groups, especially during election cycles. |

## COMMON BARRIERS

### Access and Delivery

- Periodic, infrequent, and protracted FCV threats can create uncertainty and instability, making it difficult to plan and implement long-term climate action.
- Periodic and protracted threats can undermine the capacity and legitimacy of the government and institutions to deliver climate action, especially in regions or sectors most affected by the challenges.
- Climate action may be deprioritized or disrupted during periods of conflict or insecurity, leading to delays or setbacks in achieving climate goals.

### Engagement and Coordination:

- Episodic FCV challenges can hamper dialogue and cooperation on climate action between affected groups, especially if the challenges are linked to or exacerbated by climate change.

## EXAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS

### Planning and Risk Assessment

- Take advantage of relevant windows of opportunity for promoting climate action, such as peace negotiations, periods of stability, or the aftermath of a disaster event
- Identify common triggers or pathways that lead to periodic escalation of FCV in the country, and put in place safeguards to limit their impact on the delivery of climate action
- Leverage existing early warning systems and other data sources to monitor and respond to periodic FCV threats to inform delivery of climate initiatives

### Cross-sectoral alignment and cooperation

- Link climate programming with national and regional development plans and authorities
- Sequence and build on the often long-running presence of humanitarian, peace and development actors, who are often looking to scale up climate action via new partners and channels
- Ensure climate programming reflects the needs and capacities of local communities and stakeholders, supports wider resilience-building efforts and sustainable management of natural resources where possible

ILLUSTRATIVE FCV CHARACTERISTIC

# Institutional and Social Fragility

| | |
|---|---|
| **SECURITY** | Insecurity is often concentrated in areas controlled by non-state actors (including organized gangs or insurgents). Government often has limited control or jurisdiction in these areas, including urban areas. In general, no armed conflict or widespread violence, can appear stable and have functioning institutions |
| **SOCIAL COHESION** | Trust and integration across community can often be low, with marginalization of specific social or ethnic groups. Persistence of violence and crime can erode community cohesion in heavily affected areas. |
| **CAPACITY** | Socio-economic and political conditions of a country are key factors that dictate the intensity of interactions between climate risks and FCV dynamics. One significant factor is the level of economic development. The entry points for promoting FCV-sensitive climate action in low-income countries differ markedly from those in middle-income countries. For instance, middle-income countries generally have higher levels of technical capacity, which can be harnessed to design and deliver effective climate interventions. They also often benefit from more robust public financial management systems, making it easier to scale up access to climate finance. Additionally, middle-income settings are more likely to have the physical and digital infrastructure necessary to respond to climate-related hazards and support adaptation efforts. These countries also typically offer better opportunities for leveraging private-sector involvement in climate action—an option rarely available in low-income FCV contexts. |
| **LEGITIMACY** | Often associated with policies of social marginalization. Oten oppressive, particularly with marginalized regions and groups. Government is not always inclusive or accountable. |

**COMMON BARRIERS**

## Access and Delivery

- Limited political will or commitment to implement climate action, especially if it challenges the status quo or the interests of powerful groups. Organized crime can heavily influence economic activities and political priorities, further undermining social cohesion and sustainability.
- Whether a government has consolidated power at the national and local levels or whether authority is fragmented among competing actors—whether armed or unarmed—can significantly influence the strategies needed for effective climate programming. This also applies to the relationship between national governments and local communities. In many FCV-affected areas, weak sub-national authorities are common, with power often concentrated at the central level.

## Institutional and Social Fragility *Continued*

### Engagement and Coordination

- Weak or ineffective mechanisms for coordination and collaboration on climate action, especially across different levels of governance or sectors.
- Potential resistance or backlash from certain groups or sectors that are oppressed or marginalized, especially if they perceive climate action as a threat to their livelihoods or rights.
- For climate initiatives to succeed, they must be perceived as fair, credible, and acceptable by a broad range of stakeholders.

### Other

- Low levels of public awareness or participation in climate action, especially if the government and institutions are not transparent or accountable.

**EXAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS**

### Planning and Risk Assessment

- Prioritize climate actions that strengthen national and local authorities responsible for adaptation and mitigation in order to promote institutional reform and increase governance capacity
- Ensure climate programming reflects the capacities and needs of those most vulnerable, and consults them as part of their development

### Cross-sectoral alignment and cooperation

- Engage with civil society organizations, the private sector, and others to promote climate action and build resilience where relevant
- Ensure proposed climate actions are inclusive and equitable, and contribute to building social cohesion and resilience between marginalized regions and groups where possible
- Work with national and local authorities to promote transparency and accountability in the delivery of climate action initiatives
- Ensure that proposed climate actions do not further undermine national and local authorities' efforts to promote the rule of law and strengthen justice systems

ILLUSTRATIVE FCV CHARACTERISTIC

# Transboundary Consequences of Conflict

| | |
|---|---|
| **SECURITY** | Cause of FCV-related threats often originates in another country or region, though they can spillover into neighboring areas. The latter country may otherwise be unaffected by FCV-related threats. Forced displacement and tensions over trans-boundary natural resource management are common. |
| **SOCIAL COHESION** | Cohesion and trust between local communities and IDPs or refugees is often low and escalates during times of further crises. |
| **CAPACITY** | Often high technical capacity and resourcing, though far lower in regions affected by transboundary spillovers. |
| **LEGITIMACY** | Relatively widespread acceptance of government rule and systems of governance. Though there may be concerns over the treatment of displaced people. |

## COMMON BARRIERS

### Access and Delivery

- Climate-induced displacement across border (including refugees and internally displacement peoples) can result in considerable humanitarian and development needs diverting government resources and capacities and stalling progress on climate action

### Engagement and Coordination

- Opportunities to promote cooperation and coordination on climate action with neighboring countries or regions may be hampered by wider political and economic pressures. Many have long historical roots.

### Other

- Difficult to prevent trans-boundary threats from materializing, especially if they originate from neighboring countries or regions
- Impacts of climate change are likely to further escalate transboundary FCV-threats.
- Climate-induced displacement across border (including refugees and internally displacement peoples) can result in considerable humanitarian and development needs diverting government resources and capacities and stalling progress on climate action

## EXAMPLE RECOMMENDATIONS

### Planning and Risk Assessment

- Ensure proposed climate actions do not aggravate regional tensions and transboundary natural resource conflicts, and consider steps needed to minimize these risks
- Considered the potential impact of transboundary tensions or conflict on the delivery of climate programming, and ensure provisions are included to monitor and respond to evolving FCV dynamics across countries and regions

## Institutional and Social Fragility *Continued*

### Cross-sectoral alignment and cooperation

- Link climate programming with national and regional plans and authorities responsible for promoting cross-border cooperation and coordination
- Ensure climate programming reflects the needs and capacities of local communities and stakeholders across borders, supports wider resilience-building efforts and sustainable management of transboundary natural resources where possible.

### Other

- Ensure climate programming considers the implications of climate or FCV-induced displacement (including refugees and IDPs) in the delivery of adaptation and mitigation interventions. In places where refugees or IDPs are present, teams should ensure their engagement in the design of climate-related activities and cater for their unique needs and capacities.

# BRINGING THE FRAMEWORK TOGETHER

**Promoting FCV-sensitive Climate Action relies on balancing the two core pillars in the Framework.** The first step of the Framework presents high-level principles of FCV-sensitive climate programming that are applicable across all FCV settings. These serve as minimum standards for ensuring interventions do not exacerbate the drivers of FCV; where possible, they also contribute to building wider resilience. The second step presents guidance on tailoring climate programming to the unique challenges, capacities and needs introduced by different sets of characteristics of FCV. These two steps feed into each other and are a reminder that promoting FCV-sensitive climate action is not a one-size-fits-all approach. While users may choose to prioritize some elements in the Framework over others, both are required in minimizing the risk of maladaptation and prioritizing climate actions that address the root causes of FCV.

**Deciding which aspects of the Framework to emphasize is heavily dependent on context–both with regards to the nature of FCV challenges and type of proposed climate actions.** Not all recommendations will be relevant to all climate-related interventions. Some settings may not fit neatly within one (or multiple) illustrative sets of characteristics, and there are trade-offs to balancing the outcomes of different recommendations. It is for these reasons that the Framework for FCV-sensitive Climate Action is designed to be flexible and paired with other sources of information. Users are also encouraged to complement recommendations with insights from country and sector experts, as well as inputs from other relevant tools and research.

**To demonstrate the Framework's intended use further, we include three examples of situations of FCV that exhibit different sets of characteristics, and where different elements of the Framework can be applied.**

## Box 2. Examples of considerations and applications encouraged by the Framework for FCV-sensitive Climate Action in different settings

*The below are a series of illustrative country and regional examples showcasing the sorts of considerations that the Framework for FCV-sensitive climate action are likely to encourage. The recommendations are deliberately generic and high-level, though demonstrate the priorities and tradeoffs that applications of the Framework are likely to promote in different settings.*

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### LEBANON:

As of late 2024, Lebanon is grappling with multiple, compounding shocks, including a protracted economic and financial crisis, political paralysis, a large refugee population, and more recently, an escalation in the conflict with Israel. These pressures have produced an atmosphere of heightened fragility and risk.[3] The intensification of conflict with Israel has introduced additional strains, including the displacement of people into the capital, the imposition of travel restrictions, and mounting economic fallout as both visitors and residents depart the country.

Alongside these challenges, Lebanon's climate risks are set to worsen. By 2040, temperatures are projected to rise by 1.7 to 2.2°C, leading to more frequent heatwaves. Precipitation patterns are becoming more erratic, increasing surface runoff and reducing water availability.[4] As a result, Lebanon is among the least prepared countries in the Middle East and North Africa to adapt to climate change, ranking only above Yemen, according to the popular ND-GAIN index.[5] This vulnerability stems both from direct climate impacts—such as constraints on water and energy services and disruptions to agriculture and tourism—and from the country's weak institutions and high levels of fragility.

**Examples of entry points for climate action**

In Lebanon, implementing climate action requires a nuanced understanding of institutional fragility, socio-political tensions, and the effects of conflict. The Framework provides practical guidance for navigating these complexities by encouraging teams to design context-sensitive interventions that address environmental risks while fostering resilience and social stability. It emphasizes the importance of recognizing local power structures, socio-political pressures, and risks such as elite capture, which can distort projects or entrench inequalities. For example, interventions should be carefully designed to build community trust and perceptions of fairness, ensuring they do not exacerbate existing tensions or inequalities (see Table 1: Example Recommendations for Institutional and Social Fragility). These principles are further elaborated in Chapter B-I, which explores how interactions between climate and FCV shape program delivery.

In areas less directly affected by conflict, Lebanon's middle-income status may allow for a broader range of interventions, including private sector innovations like parametric insurance–areas that the Framework encourages users to explore where entry points exist. In such contexts, leveraging decentralized governance structures and strong local identities can create

3. Lebanon Risk and Resilience Assessment
4. Lebanon CCDR
5. ND-GAIN Index 2023

sustainable, community-driven solutions. Conversely, in conflict-affected regions, the Framework highlights the need to monitor displacement and return patterns to avoid aggravating tensions and to prioritize actions that promote long-term resilience and stability. Chapter B-I offers guiding questions and resources to help teams assess these dynamics and align climate interventions with Lebanon's socio-political and institutional context, ensuring they are inclusive, targeted, and locally anchored.

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### LAKE CHAD:

The Lake Chad region spans a number of countries that sustain the livelihoods of more than 30 million people. Covering eight percent of the continent's area, the basin's rich biodiversity underpins a range of livelihoods—from fishing, agriculture, and livestock rearing to trade and transportation—all reliant on the Lake's vital resources.[6]

The region is also the site of a complex, transboundary crisis of displacement, fragility, and conflict. Marginalization, weak service provision, violence, and climate risks across most of the region's countries have led to it remaining mired in economic marginalization and stagnation, with people suffering from high levels of poverty, weak and highly centralized institutions, and unstable political environments. The emergence of armed groups in remote regions and their control over significant territory has further challenged the region's stability.

Climate risks across the region exacerbate the governance and economic challenges facing the territory. The region is among the most vulnerable in the world to extreme droughts, floods, heatwaves, desertification and land degradation due to climate change. These risks, which combine both frequent shocks and slow-onset climate impacts, are already having a detrimental impact on people's lives and livelihoods, with hundreds of thousands of people affected by floods each year, and droughts restricting access to food and markets for millions of people annually.[7]

**Examples of entry points for climate action**

The Lake Chad region faces deeply interconnected and transboundary challenges, with large areas under contested governance, weak or nonexistent institutions, and high levels of social fragility exacerbated by armed groups. Limited access to markets, services, and information further constrains opportunities for resilience-building. In this context, the Framework encourages users to consider transboundary complexities when designing climate interventions, particularly by emphasizing the need to align actions with the priorities of affected communities while avoiding further marginalization of populations in contested territories (See Table 1, Example Recommendations for Contested Territories and Transboundary Consequences of Conflict).

The Framework also supports teams in leveraging the work of relevant external actors in supporting FCV-sensitive climate action, such as humanitarian, development, and peace organizations, to ensure climate actions are coherent and complementary. It highlights the importance of integrating inclusive approaches to natural resource management that promote cooperation and reduce tensions. For example, by fostering dialogue and trust-building between communities and across regions, interventions can address shared vulnerabilities while strengthening social cohesion (See Section 1, part V on coordination across development, disaster risk management, humanitarian, and peacebuilding actors to limit impacts on climate and FCV).

6. Lake Chad Risk and Resilience Assessment
7. G5 Sahel CCDR

In the context of resource scarcity, as experienced across the Lake Chad region, the Framework encourages users to consider use of mediation and collaborative resource management practices to prevent competition from escalating into conflict. By aligning climate actions with local and regional capacities and promoting multi-stakeholder coordination, the Framework helps ensure that interventions address the region's interconnected challenges holistically, supporting both resilience and stability (See Section 1, part I on prioritizing climate programming that addresses FCV root causes and enhances the foundations of peacebuilding).

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### AFGHANISTAN:

In Afghanistan, decades of conflict and instability are compounded by weak governance, a punitive legal environment, and the further marginalization, exclusion and disadvantage of women and minorities. Fragility and instability are further exacerbated by Afghanistan's high exposure to climate shocks. Flash floods, droughts, and landslides, as well as extreme heat and cold spells, are recurrent, with the former causing internal displacement on a regular basis and the latter leading to poor health outcomes, particularly among marginalized groups.[8] National authorities remain largely excluded from international forums and processes, including the UNFCCC climate negotiations. While direct conflict has reduced in intensity, the country's social contract remains severely fractured, with profound repercussions for women, girls, and other marginalized groups.

**Examples of entry points for climate action**

Although active conflict has lessened in intensity as of late 2024, the social contract in Afghanistan remains severely compromised, with devastating impacts on women, girls, and other marginalized groups. In applying the Framework, users are encouraged to prioritize the needs of these vulnerable populations when designing climate interventions, ensuring that actions do not inadvertently expose them to additional risks or deepen existing inequities. This includes a series of relevant guiding questions and considerations for design of FCV-sensitive climate action in such settings ( see Section 1, IV on prioritizing the needs and capacities of vulnerable regions and groups, and Table 1, Example Recommendations for Protracted and/or Periodic Conflict).

By emphasizing the importance of localized approaches, the Framework also supports teams in identifying and collaborating with champions and trusted actors at the community level. These actors are vital for designing inclusive and context-sensitive interventions that reflect the realities of those most affected by climate risks. In a country with limited national-level engagement, the Framework highlights the value of building on the expertise and long-standing presence of humanitarian and peace actors, sequencing efforts to leverage their insights and networks. Suggestions for doing so, and core considerations, are discussed in more detail in Section 1 (see Part V on coordination across development, disaster risk management, humanitarian, and peacebuilding actors to limit impacts on climate and FCV).

Through these considerations, the Framework helps ensure that climate actions in Afghanistan are both responsive and adaptive, addressing immediate risks while fostering resilience among marginalized communities. By grounding interventions in local capacities and supporting inclusive planning processes, it promotes sustainable outcomes even in the face of Afghanistan's ongoing challenges.

8. Afghanistan Risk and Resilience Assessment

**The illustrative case studies presented in this section provide practical examples of how the Framework can integrate and build on insights from CCDRs and RRAs.** While the recommendations for each context are inherently specific to the situation, these examples highlight the critical considerations and priorities that stakeholders are likely to emphasize in advancing FCV-sensitive climate action. These considerations are directly informed by the guiding questions and resources outlined in Table 1.

**The regional and country examples further demonstrate that many FCV-affected countries often exhibit multiple overlapping dimensions of fragility.** Within the Framework, this highlights the need for users to consult the guiding questions and resources associated with all relevant FCV characteristics applicable to a given context. In applying this guidance, users may prioritize certain characteristics over others, reflecting the specific needs and complexities of the situation.

**The heatmap in Figure IV illustrates these dynamics using case studies of Lebanon, Lake Chad, and Afghanistan.** In the context of Lake Chad, for instance, recommendations addressing challenges linked to Contested Territories, Institutional Fragility, and Transboundary Consequences are particularly pertinent. In Lebanon, guidance related to High-Intensity Conflict and broader Fragility tends to be more relevant. These examples underscore the importance of tailoring FCV-sensitive approaches to the unique characteristics and priorities of each setting, as outlined within the Framework.

**FIGURE 7.**

## Showcasing the overlapping nature of FCV characteristics: examples from Lebanon, Lake Chad, and Afghanistan

| | Relevance of different FCV Characteristics to each context* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | High Intensity Conflict | Contested Territories | Protracted and /or Periodic Conflict | Institutional and Social Fragility | Transboundary consequences |
| Lebanon | | | | | |
| Lake Chad Region | | | | | |
| Afghanistan | | | | | |

**Notes:** The heatmap identifies which illustrative sets of FCV characteristics are most relevant to each context. Additional insights into how the Framework might work in each context are included in the section below. Country designations are intended to demonstrate the overlapping nature of FCV characteristics as well as the diversity of different FCV environments. Designations are made by the authors and do not represent official WB categorizations.

# CONCLUSION

**The examples included in this framework are intended to demonstrate how the Framework's conceptual elements can be applied in practical terms.** They do not demonstrate the full process of translating its considerations and recommendations into real world programming, but provide an idea of potential entry points for teams working to implement climate action in FCV settings.

**There already exist many examples where these considerations have been factored into programming.** In Cameroon, where teams developing the CCDR modeled the gendered impact of climate action on employment under a variety of climate adaptation scenarios; and in Iraq, where the consequences of a green transition on public expenditure and services were projected so as to identify negative impacts on certain vulnerable groups.[lv] This Framework is intended to complement these examples and encourage the integration of FCV sensitivity into climate action more widely.

**Working effectively in FCV settings is a core part of delivering on the strategies and plans of the World Bank.** This extends to climate action. To ensure that teams are able to meet this ambition, they must have the tools necessary to identify the specific challenges that exist in FCV settings, integrate them into their work, and adapt, develop, and deliver appropriate support.

**This Framework is designed as a tool to help teams accomplish this goal.** It builds on core strategic frameworks, such as the World Bank's Climate Change Action Plan and the FCV Strategy. By providing conceptual and practical guidance on working in the most challenging operational environments, the Framework is in line with the Evolution Roadmap and serves to increase the World Bank's capacity to respond to intertwined challenges and crises–from climate change and food insecurity to fragility and pandemic recovery.

**The Framework advances these and other significant resources that already exist across teams within the Bank to help those working on climate action to understand the relevance of FCV dynamics to their work, the potential impact of their work on dynamics of FCV, and the nuances and difference between types of FCV that are critical to designing appropriate responses.** It includes content that contributes to a baseline level of knowledge on FCV sensitivity. This includes information on how to assess specific FCV threats and vulnerabilities, how to prioritize the most vulnerable regions and sectors, and how to design climate-related activities that are best suited to the political and economic environment.

**It also aims to build a shared lexicon for sharing expertise across different knowledge domains.** In doing so, it can serve as a catalyst for more informed conversations between those with expertise in climate change, those with knowledge of FCV-related environments, and those directly engaged in country and regional operations. With this in mind, it is designed to be accessible and relevant to people with a wide range of expertise, including country coordinators, experts from Global Practices, and those who work to produce country-specific resources like RRAs and CCDRs.

**While this framework does go further than other existing tools, it is not a one-stop-shop, but rather an analytical resource that can help teams decide which additional tools or resources to use.** Each of the components of the Framework–from the specific FCV Characteristics, to the links between natural resource management, climate change and climate-related hazards, and FCV, to the role of social sustainability in implementing development and climate responses–are themselves the subjects of in-depth literature and tools, many of which are cited in the appendices and references.

**Finally, this is a tool to be shared.** It aims to bolster the abilities of the World Bank, its partners, and others who are responding to climate change and climate-related hazards in some of the contexts where doing so is highly complex and critically necessary. Appropriate responses will require strong partnerships and the continues exchange and cooperation between the World Bank, its partners, and the communities themselves who are most affected by climate change, climate-related hazards, fragility, and conflict. This tool is a contribution to the collective effort to meet these challenges and deliver climate action in the places it is most needed.

# APPENDIX A
# MEDIATING FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE CLIMATE CHANGE AND FCV INTERACTIONS

**The relationship between climate change and FCV is often mediated by context.** Although climate change is a threat multiplier that shapes FCV risk, its effects will vary depending on a wide range of socio-economic and governance-related factors–including many of those highlighted in Figure 4.[i] These factors work together to either mitigate or exacerbate the extent to which climate change influences FCV dynamics.

**Below we highlight a number of traits that mediate the capacity of countries and communities to respond to the impacts of climate change.**

**FIGURE 8.**
Contextual factors shape the relationship between climate change and FCV[ii]



- Social exclusion, marginalization, and discrimination. The dynamics of social exclusion, marginalization, and discrimination are compounded by a complex interplay of socioeconomic, cultural, and gender-related factors.[iii] The uneven distribution of resources, power, and access to justice, as well as geographical disparities, creates a web of vulnerabilities. Those trapped within this cycle face heightened exposure to the adverse impacts of climate change and find themselves less equipped to cope with and recover from these challenges.[iv] The result is a vicious cycle of inequality, where disadvantaged groups bear the brunt of climate change effects, subsequently deepening existing inequalities. Inclusivity is crucial in addressing climate change; it necessitates the active participation and collective knowledge of all segments of society.

- Poor governance. Effective governance is a key ingredient in supporting countries to transition out of FCV and to adapt to climate change. Indeed, countries suffering from poor governance are often stuck in a cycle as many of the same factors that plague weak governments make it particularly challenging for them to address climate change, leaving them more vulnerable (see Figure 5 for an example of climate, FCV and governance related links). Without effective governance, it is difficult to provide basic services, sustainable development, long-term planning, and citizen participation–as well as to successfully finance climate interventions and implement climate projects. In addition, there is a high risk that climate actions could be maladaptive and exacerbate underlying tensions and grievances.

**FIGURE 9.**

Climate-FCV Pathways[v]



- **L**ack of institutional capacity and basic services. The ability to absorb climate stress and shocks depends on a government's capacity to provide services and thereby reduce people's vulnerability, particularly the most marginalized. For example, investing in infrastructure (energy, irrigation, transportation) that can support adaptation. Education can help people understand, cope with, and respond to climate change, especially women. Similarly, better healthcare decreases people's vulnerability to climate shocks. Effective institutions are better able to tackle problems when they arise, resulting in faster, more efficient responses to climate shocks and reducing the lasting damage they do.

- Neighboring FCV challenges or a prolonged history of violence. These are two factors that are routinely linked to fragility and conflict situations. 'Bad neighbors' refers to neighboring or sharing borders with states that are fragile or conflict prone. While not necessarily contagious, political instability and social and economic upheaval can spread.[vi] Likewise, conflict and fragility are linked to a history of violence. This is largely because conflict and fragility tend to exacerbate the conditions that led to them in the first place, helping keeping countries in a cycle of conflict and fragility.[vii]

- Environmental and resource management. Environmental and natural resources are not the cause of FCV but the exploitation of natural resources and environmental stresses contribute to the outbreak of conflicts, sustain conflicts, and undermine peacebuilding–all of which contribute to further fragility and violence.[viii] Historical grievances around access to land and resources can serve as a root cause of conflict and violence, while resource trade can finance conflicts and spoil peace.[ix] Furthermore, poverty, inequality, and grievances can take root in ways that can foster conflict when resource dependence overlaps with exclusion, marginalization, and discrimination.[x]

- Levels of poverty, growth, and development. These variables can be important determinants of climate change outcomes. Generally, low-income countries are more vulnerable to climate change and susceptible to FCV risks, as they are less resilient and less capable of coping with climate stresses and shocks. Conversely, factors correlated with growth and development, such as good governance, inclusion, and capacity, are also correlated with the ability to address problems. There are, however, no guarantees that growth and development will lead to reduced vulnerability. The right kinds of growth and development are needed to ensure resilience.

**FIGURE 10.**

Environmental risks and opportunities across the conflict cycle[xi]



# APPENDIX B
# UNPACKING DIMENSION OF FCV

### CAPACITY

**Capacity gaps reflect the extent to which governments and key stakeholders have the ability and resources to ensure access to and quality of public services, and to respond effectively to shocks and crises.** Examples of common traits include:

- The availability and adequacy of physical, human, and financial resources for delivering public services, such as health, education, water, sanitation, and energy.
- The efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery systems, processes, and standards, and their alignment with the needs and preferences of the population.
- The level of preparedness and resilience of public service delivery to cope with shocks and crises, such as natural disasters, pandemics, or conflicts.

### SECURITY

**Security gaps reflect the extent to which people and communities are protected from violence, crime and human rights violations.** Examples of common traits include:

- The prevalence and intensity of armed conflict, terrorism, and organized crime, and their impact on civilians, infrastructure, and the environment.
- The availability and effectiveness of mechanisms for conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding, such as dialogue, mediation, reconciliation, and disarmament.
- The prevalence and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and other forms of human rights violations, such as torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.

### SOCIAL COHESION

**Social cohesion gaps reflect the extent to which people and communities share a sense of belonging, trust, and solidarity.** Examples of common traits include:

- The level of inclusion and participation of different groups and communities in social, economic, and political life, and their access to opportunities and resources.
- The degree of respect and recognition of diversity and pluralism, and the prevention and management of discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion.

- The existence and quality of social networks, associations, and movements that foster civic engagement, collective action, and social capital.
- The availability and accessibility of mechanisms for dialogue, consultation, and feedback between state and society, and among different groups and communities.

### LEGITIMACY

**Legitimacy gaps arise when governments and key stakeholders struggle to establish and maintain public trust in governing institutions.** Examples of common include:

- The degree of representation and participation of different groups and communities in political processes and institutions, such as elections, parliaments, and parties.
- The degree of accountability and transparency of governing institutions and actors, such as the executive, judiciary, and civil service.
- The degree of responsiveness and inclusiveness of governing institutions and actors to the needs and demands of the population, especially the poor and marginalized.
- The degree of adherence and compliance with the rule of law, human rights, and democratic principles by governing institutions and actors.

# APPENDIX C
# ADDITIONAL RESOURCES AND TOOLS

**Below is a list of relevant resources and tools that CCDR Team may want to consider in promoting FCV-sensitivity in CCDR delivery.** The list is not exhaustive, and is aimed at showcasing the breadth of existing materials available. Advice on additional resources can be gathered from the GCRP or FCV focal points within relevant GPs.

| RELEVANT WB RESOURCES | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| Defueling Conflict Report | The report highlights environment-conflict dynamics with views to help integrate them into World Bank interventions in FCS. It offers an in-depth analysis of the interplay between environment, climate change, fragility, and gender, while taking a deep look into World Bank operations in FCS. |
| FCV Strategy 2020-2025 | The WBG's FCV Strategy outlines commitments to enhance the WBG's effectiveness to support countries in addressing the drivers and impacts of FCV and strengthening their resilience, especially for their most vulnerable and marginalized populations. |
| Global Facility for Transboundary Water Cooperation (GFTWC) | The GFTWC aims to address transboundary water management, including focusing on regional climate action and conflict prevention. The GFTWC views regional climate action through addressing cooperative transboundary water management and development as a key aspect to improve the FCV situation in regions (including as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding tool but also as it helps improve the possibilities to provide an improved situation for key basic services, such as water and sanitation, to be delivered) |
| Barbosa et al. 2023. Natural Resource Management and Environment Considerations in FCS: Evidence from World Bank Country Climate Development Reports | The note identifies good practices in Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs) that can help improve future CCDR's analytical approach to considering the interplay of climate change, environment, and natural resource management in FCS. |
| Risk and Resilience Assessments | Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRA) are the World Bank's primary diagnostic tool to understand fragility, conflict, and violence as well as risks and sources of resilience. |
| SSI Core Diagnostics and Country Profiles | The WB SIData_Database includes all SSI Core Diagnostics and Country Profiles. The database also contains a number of other resources that could support CCDR's analytical work (Indigenous People & Ethnic Minorities Profiles, Gender Profiles, etc.). |

| GUIDELINES FOR FCV-SENSITIVE CLIMATE ACTION | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| Adelphi & Unwelt Bundesamt Guidelines for Conflict-Sensitive Adaptation | The guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation developed by Adelphi outline how to design and implement an adaptation project in a fragile or conflict-affected context. The document is addressed to planner and project managers, providing tools and methods to ensure that an adaptation project does not exacerbate tensions and, ideally, contribute to peace and stability. |
| CDA Collaborative Learning Projects & CARE Monitoring and Evaluating Conflict Sensitivity report | This document gives practical guidance on how to monitor and evaluate that interaction between an intervention and conflict. It includes a discussion of the methodological questions that arise when embarking on a process to monitor and evaluate unintended interactions with conflict, as well as a range of practical and field-tested tools to enable the reader to do this. |
| IMF Climate Challenges in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas | This document draws from structural socioeconomic characteristics and differences between FCS-list and non-FCS countries to assess how climate shocks and fragility exacerbate each other in FCV contexts. The report concludes on the urgent need for urgent conflict-sensitive international support to tackle climate-related consequences in FCS-list countries. |
| Mercy Corps Addressing the Climate-Conflict Nexus: Evidence, Insights, and Future Directions | This Mercy Corps report outlines the relationship between climate change and armed conflict, highlighting the knock-on and amplifying effects between them. The report focuses in particular on fragile states and those facing protracted crises, those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Finally, the report proposes joint programmatic recommendations to address both climate vulnerabilities and peace objectives. |
| Stockholm Hub / SIPRI Three Steps to Including Conflict Considerations in the Design of Climate Change Adaptation Projects | This policy brief suggests a three-step method for incorporating the evaluation of conflict risks into the planning of climate change adaptation initiatives. These steps involve: (a) examining the interplay between climate and conflict dynamics on a project-specific scale, (b) appraising the adaptation project's impact on these dynamics, and (c) merging the findings from the climate-conflict analysis into the adaptation project's blueprint. |
| Umwelt Bundesamt Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change | The guidelines report offers a stocktaking of conflict sensitivity and adaptation in theory and practice. The document identifies key design elements of a guide on conflict-sensitive adaptation through a review of existing guides on conflict sensitivity in general and how adaptation to climate change is or can be reflected by these approaches based on empirical insights and a consultations process with experts from the different issues areas affected. |
| UN DPPA Climate Security Mechanism Toolbox–Conceptual Approach | This document aims to contribute to a better understanding of the complex interlinkages between climate change, peace and security. The focus of the approach is on the assessment of the interaction between climate change and socio-political, economic and demographic factors that can result in major livelihood and economic disruption, political instability and insecurity at different scales (e.g. local, national, transnational). |
| UNDP Climate Finance for Sustainable Peace Report | The Climate Finance for Sustainable Peace Report aims to address the difficulties in the access to climate finance in FCV-affected countries. The document focuses on: (I) trends in access to climate finance in conflict-affected and fragile contexts; (ii) gaps and opportunities to leverage the co-benefits of climate action for peace and security; (iii) strategies for mainstreaming climate-related security risks into climate finance; and (iv) recommendations to make climate finance work more effectively in contexts affected by conflict and fragility. |
| UNEP Addressing Climate-related Security Risks: Conflict Sensitivity for Climate Change Adaptation and Sustainable Livelihoods–Guidance Note | The UNEP Guidance aims to strengthen the capacity of countries and international partners to identify environment and climate-related security risks at global, national and community levels, and to programme suitable risk reduction and response measures. The report includes practical steps to (i) assess climate-related security risks; (ii) identify entry points for policies and strategies; and (iii) enhance conflict-sensitivity in projects. |

| COUNTRY CLIMATE AND FCV BRIEFS | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| Adelphi Country climate and FCV briefs | Adelphi regularly publishes thematic and country reports on climate-related issues, including on the Climate & Security and the Climate Finance themes. |
| NUPI Country climate and Security Briefs | The Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institut (NUPI) regularly publishes thematic and country articles and reports on climate-related and FCV-related issues. NUPI also partners with SIPRI on the Climate-related Peace and Security Risks research project. |
| SIPRI Country climate and FCV briefs | SIPRI regularly publishes country reports on climate, peace and security, providing context analysis and strategic recommendations to tackle challenges and foster resilience. SIPRI also operates the Climate Change and the Security and Climate-related Peace and Security Risks projects, aiming to identify, assess and mitigate climate-related security risks. |

| DATABASES & MONITORING TOOLS | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| ACLED Dashboard | The ACLED dashboard tracks and analyzes armed conflicts worldwide, measuring violence, protests, and political instability using real-time data at local level. |
| ACLED Early Warning Dashboard | The ACLED Early Warning Dashboard complements the classic ACLED Dashboard by offering a global view on national dynamics of violence, social unrest and conflict. The dashboard includes a detailed description of violent events, including location, actors involved and current dynamics at national and subnational levels. |
| Compound Risk Monitor (WBG) | The Compound Risk Monitor (CRM) is a global early warning system and horizon scan exercise that provides a high-level overview of current or near-term conditions across multiple risk dimensions. It flags countries where different sectoral threats have the potential to contribute to a compound crisis, with a risk outlook of up to 12 months ahead. |
| Contextual Risk Data Portal (WBG) | The Contextual Risk Data Portal is an interactive risk analysis platform displaying a multidimensional index and database for each country globally. Analytical dimensions include 1) Security & Conflict; 2) Political Risk, Governance & Civil Liberties; 3) Labor Workforce; 4) Health and Population; 5) Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services & Climate Change; 6) Land & Access to Natural Resources; 7) Social Cohesion; 8) Gender; 9) Reprisals. |
| ECOWAS–Early Warning and Early Response Network (ECOWARN) | As the Early Warning System of the ECOWAS, ECOWARN monitors and provides alerts on violent events to facilitate coordination and rapid response in West Africa. |
| European Commission's Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) | The GCRI monitors and assesses the risk of violent conflict globally. It is exclusively based on the collection of quantitative indicators (social, economic, security, political environmental, and demographic data) from reputable open sources. |
| European Commission's INFORM Early Warning System (INFORM Risk Index, INFORM Warning, INFORM Severity & INFORM Climate Change) | INFORM is a quantitative Early Warning System and Risk Index. It is divided into four components, each dedicated to specific use case (Risk Assessment, Early Warning, Crisis Response and Climate Change Adaptation) and relies on multidimensional open-source data. |
| European External Action Service's (EEAS) EU Conflict–Early Warning System | The EU conflict Early Warning System (EWS) is an evidence-based risk management tool that monitors non-EU countries at risks of violent conflict with a time horizon of up to four years, looking at structural underlying factors of violence. |

| DATABASES & MONITORING TOOLS | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (FSI) | The Fragile States Index provides a measure of multidimensional fragility, across four dimensions (Cohesion, Economic, Political and Social) and 12 indicators drawing from a combination of qualitative and quantitative data. |
| International Displacement Monitoring Center's (IDMC) Global International Displacement Database (GIDD) and Global Displacement Risk Model Tool | The IDMC's Global Internal Displacement Database (GIDD) provides comprehensive information on internal displacement worldwide. It includes internal displacement associated with (i) conflict and generalized violence and with (ii) sudden-onset natural hazard-related disasters. Data sources include quantitative and qualitative sources. |
| Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative's ND-GAIN Index | The ND-GAIN Country Index summarizes a country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience. The index is composed of three vulnerability indicators (exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity) and three readiness indicators (economic, governance, social). |
| OECD's States of Fragility Index | The States of Fragility index provides a quantitative measure of multidimensional fragility, identifying the most fragile states globally. Its ranking is based on a fragility framework across six dimensions (Economic, Environmental, Human, Political Security and Societal). |
| Oregon State University (OSU)'s Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database | The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database contains global & regional information about international basins and transboundary freshwater bodies, as well as related disputes and treaties. The database's website also features maps and research papers related to water conflict and/or cooperation. |
| Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and PRIO's Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) | ViEWS is a data-driven forecasting system, targeted at generating monthly predictions of state-based conflict fatalities up to 36 months ahead. The Early Warning System uses the PRIO grid technology to establish localized predictions within 55x55 kms divisions in Africa and the Middle East. |
| Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset | The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dataset provides systematic data on organized violence globally, using press and open sources. |
| Water Peace and Security's (WPS) Global Early Warning Tool | The Global Tool of WPS is a quantitative Early Warning System providing monthly forecasts on future organized violence and conflict hotspots globally with a 12-month time horizon. |

| OTHER RELEVANT RESOURCES | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) report, Green Conflict Minerals: The fuels of conflict in the transition to a low-carbon economy | This IISD report examines the impact of green minerals extraction on conflict dynamics in fragile and conflict-affected countries. It argues that, while the extraction of such minerals is necessary and is likely to benefit developing economies in boosting growth and energy transition, its benefits could potentially be outbalanced by the emergence or exacerbation of fragility, conflict and violence along the supply chains |

# END NOTES


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